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Asset allocation and portfolio decisions are at the heart of money management and
draw great attention from both academics and practitioners. In addition, the segmen-
tation of fund investors (i.e., the clientele effect) in the money management industry
is well known but poorly understood. The objective of this dissertation is to study
the implications of regime switching behaviors in asset returns on asset allocation and
to analyze the clientele effect as well as the impact of portfolio management contracts
on fund investment.
Chapter 2 presents an innovative regime switching multi-factor model accounting
for the different regime switching behaviors in the systematic and idiosyncratic com-
ponents of asset returns. A Gibbs sampling approach for estimation is proposed to
deal with the computational challenges that arise from a large number of assets and
multiple Markov chains. In the empirical analysis, the model is applied to study sector
v
exchange-traded funds (ETFs). The idiosyncratic volatilities of different sector ETFs
exhibit a strong degree of covariation and state-dependent patterns, which are differ-
ent from the dynamics of their systematic component. In a dynamic asset allocation
problem, the certainty equivalent return is computed and compared across various
models for an investor with constant relative risk aversion. The out-of-sample asset
allocation experiments show that the new regime switching model statistically signifi-
cantly outperformed the linear multi-factor model and conventional regime switching
models driven by a common Markov chain. The results suggest that it is not only im-
portant to account for regimes in portfolio decisions, but correct specification about
the structure and number of regimes is of equal importance.
Chapter 3 proposes a rational explanation for the existence of clientele effects
under commonly used portfolio management contracts. It shows that although a
fund manager always benefits from his market timing skill, which comes from his
private information about future market returns, the value of the manager’s private
information to an investor can be negative when the investor is sufficiently more risk-
averse than the manager. This suggests different clienteles for skilled and unskilled
funds. Investors in skilled funds are uniformly more risk-tolerant than investors in
unskilled funds. Moreover, a comparative statics analysis is conducted to investigate
the effects of the manager’s skill level, contract parameters, and market conditions on
an investor’s fund choice. The results suggest that the investors who are sufficiently
more risk-averse than the manager should include fulcrum fees in the contract to
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2.1 Summary statistics of sector ETF and Fama-French three-factor re-
turns. The table (Panel A) reports the summary statistics, the normal-
ity (Jarque-Bera test), the autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic
(ARCH) (Engle’s ARCH test with lags up to 4) and autocorrelation
(Ljung–Box test with lags up to 10) test statistics and their corre-
sponding p-values for the 9 sector ETFs and Fama-French three factor
weekly returns over the period of December 16, 1998 to September 9,
2016 (924 weeks). Panel B reports the correlation matrix of these time
series. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Selection of multivariate regime switching model for Market, SMB and
HML returns. The table reports the log-likelihood, and the linearity
test results, and Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian in-
formation criterion (BIC), Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQC)
for the multivariate Markov switching models: Ft = µ(St)+Ω1/2(St)εt
with ks = 1, 2, 3, 4. The sample period is from December 16, 1998 to
September 9, 2016 (924 weeks). The models’ acronyms are as follows:
MS represents Markov Switching, I represents the presence of regime-
dependent intercept, H represents the presence of regime-dependent
variance-covariance matrix (heteroskedasticity). . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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2.3 Parameter estimates of single and four-state multivariate Markov regime-
switching model for Market, SMB and HML returns. The model is
Ft = µ(St) + Ω1/2(St)εt with ks = 4. The sample period is from
December 16, 1998 to September 9, 2016 (924 weeks). . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Two-state regime-switching model for individual ETF’s idiosyncratic
returns. The table reports the estimation results for a two-state regime-
switching model for ETF idiosyncratic returns. The estimated model
is Rj,t = αj(Zj,t) +
∑K
i=1 βij(Ŝt)Fi,t +σj(Zj,t)uj,t, where Fi,t are the sys-
tematic risk factors, Ŝt is a four-state Markov chain identified using
factor returns in the first step, Zj,t is also a two-state Markov chain
(Regime 1 represents a low volatility idiosyncratic regime and Regime
2 represents a high volatility idiosyncratic regime), σ1 (σ2) is a Sec-
tor ETF’s idiosyncratic volatility in low (high) idiosyncratic volatility
state, p11 (p22) represents an idiosyncratic Markov chain’s transition
probability of staying in its low (high) volatility state. Parameters
marked in bold are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
The sample period is from 12-31-1998 to 9-9-2016 (924 weeks). . . . 23
2.5 Correlations and Concordance indices of the high-volatility regimes in
individual sector ETF idiosyncratic returns. The correlation parame-
ters are reported in lower triangular and the concordance values are
reported in the upper triangular. The sample period is from 12-31-1998
to 9-9-2016 (924 weeks). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
x
2.6 Selection of regime switching model for nine sector ETFs and factor
returns. The table reports the log-likelihood, and the linearity test
results, and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for the new Markov
regime switching model and traditional Markov regime switching multi-
factor models with a common Markov chain. kz represents the number
of regimes in the idiosyncratic returns and ks represents the number of
regimes in the systematic parts of asset returns. The sample period is
from December 16, 1998 to September 9, 2016 (924 weeks). . . . . . 26
2.7 Parameter estimates of the new Markov regime switching model for 9
sector ETFs and Fama-French 3 factor returns with 2 states for id-
iosyncratic component and 3 states for systematic component. Param-
eters marked in bold are statistically significant at the 95% confidence
level. The sample period is from 12-31-1998 to 9-9-2016 (924 weeks). 28
2.8 Root mean square error (%) of Markov regime switching models for
in-sample and out-of sample fitting. The table reports the in-sample
and out-of-sample RMSE for the new Markov regime switching model
with ks = 3, kz = 2 and the conventional Markov regime switching
model with k = 2 and k = 3. The in-sample period is from December
16, 1998 to November 23, 2007 and the out-of-sample period is from
November 30, 2007 to September 23, 2011, on a weekly basis. . . . . 31
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2.9 Out-of-sample performance of a buy-and-hold investor under various
models The investment period includes 200 periods from December 7,
2008 to September 23, 2011. The table displays the annualized mean
return and certainty equivalent return (CER) of investment perfor-
mance under various models. ∆CER equals the CER of a model mi-
nus that of the new regime switching model and the p-value measures
the significance level of the difference obtained through the bootstrap
experiments with 50,000 trails. Performance statistics are boldfaced
when these are the best. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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The ongoing U.S. stock bull market since March 9, 2009 has already become the
longest one in American history. But the remarkable run and economic expansion
will not last forever due to the cyclical nature of economics. Financial markets often
exhibit dramatic changes in their patterns, associated with economic events or unex-
pected changes in economic policy. While some changes are permanent breaks, often
the asset returns preserve the changed patterns for a period of time and switch back
to original or other regimes. Many studies have documented the regime switching
behaviors not only in stock returns but also in systematic pricing factors (Ang and
Bekaert, 2002; Ang and Chen, 2002; Guidolin and Timmermann, 2007b, 2008; Turner
et al., 1989). Therefore, it is a critical task to investigate the implications of regimes
switching on asset allocation and portfolio decisions.
There is a growing body of literature that highlights the importance of account-
ing for regime switching in asset allocation (Ang and Bekaert, 2004; Guidolin and
Timmermann, 2007a; Tu, 2010). However, most of the existing literature on regime
switching assumes that the regime shift in all assert returns is governed by a com-
mon state variable.1 In addition, there are no studies that examine the implication
of regime switching idiosyncratic volatilities on asset allocation. Furthermore, it is
usually difficult to apply regime switching models to study a large number of assets
due to the curse of dimensionality.
1One exception is Vial (2015), in which the author considers the time-varying synchronization of
regimes in different countries’ gross total return indices.
2
To address these limitations and challenges, Chapter 2 presents a Markov regime
switching multi-factor model accounting for different regime switching behaviors in
the systematic and idiosyncratic components of asset returns. A Bayesian approach
is employed to deal with the computational challenge arising from estimating a high-
dimensional regime switching model. In the empirical analysis, this approach is ap-
plied to study nine sector ETFs and a regime switching version of Fama-French three-
factor model is considered. Linear multi-factor model is strongly rejected by the data.
The systematic component of the sector ETFs exhibits three different regimes, which
are characterized by the difference in the risk premia, factor loadings, and variance-
covariance matrix. The three regimes can be interpreted as bull, slow-growth, and
bear state. While two regimes in the dynamics of sector ETFs’ idiosyncratic volatili-
ties are identified and they have natural interpretations as low idiosyncratic volatility
and high idiosyncratic volatility state.
A dynamic asset allocation problem is studied under this model. The results
show that optimal asset allocation weights vary significantly across different regimes.
The out-of-sample asset allocation experiment confirms that the economic gain of ac-
counting for regime switching in investment is significant. In addition, the new regime
switching model delivers superior risk-adjusted investment performance compared to
regime switching models with a common Markov chain. The outperformance is mea-
sured in terms of certainty-equivalent returns, ranging from 1% to 5% depending on
the investment horizon. The economic gain or outperformance is more significant for
investors with a shorter investment horizon.
Standard portfolio choice theory ignores the delegated portfolio managers (e.g.,
mutual fund managers) and assumes that investors are directly managing their own
money. This assumption has its root in the equity market in the mid-1950s but
it no longer does: more than 100 million US retail investors accounted for half of
3
all US households delegate the management of their wealth to professional portfo-
lio managers at the year-end 2018 according to a report by Investment Company
Institute (ICI).2 One interesting phenomenon in delegated portfolio management is
the clientele effect that fund investors appear to segment the markets. For example,
Blackburn et al. (2009) find that there are different investor clienteles in value and
growth funds and risk aversion is an important attribute to differentiate these two
groups of investors. Investors in value funds appear to be more risk-averse than in-
vestors in growth funds. In addition, Chan et al. (2002) find that growth managers
have greater abilities to generate alpha than value managers. The existing litera-
ture attributes the clientele effects to irrationality, investor sophistication or other
psychological tendencies (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Del Guercio and Reuter,
2014).
In contrast to the behavioral attributes that may or may not determine fund
clienteles, Chapter 3 presents a rational model for the clientele effect and derives
the emergence of clienteles endogenously based purely on risk aversion.3 In this
model, there is heterogeneity in the fund manager’s skill which comes from privately
informed information about the future market returns whose content is unknown
to investors. The anticipative information is always valuable to the manager and
increases in the information precision (i.e. skill). However, when the manager and
the investors exhibit different risk preferences, the private nature of this information
can be costly and adverse to the investors. Investors whose risk aversion lies above
a threshold value that depends on the fund manager’s risk prudence would prefer to
choose the unskilled fund rather than skilled ones. Thus, the fund investor clientele
is endogenously segmented. The relatively risk-tolerant investors will prefer skilled
funds, whereas the highly risk-averse investors will prefer unskilled funds. This result
2https://www.ici.org/pdf/2019_factbook.pdf
3Chapter 3 is based on my co-authored paper Hu and Rindisbacher (2018). Some contents of the
paper are also incorporated into the introductory and conclusive chapters.
4
thus provides theoretical justification for some recent empirical findings of the clientele
effect in the mutual fund industry (e.g., Del Guercio and Reuter, 2014).
Another key feature of delegated portfolio management is the presence of portfolio
management contracts between fund managers and investors. Chapter 3 also exam-
ines the impacts of commonly used contracts on the investment decisions of fund
managers and investors as well as the clientele effect. In the absence of performance
fees, investors whose relative risk aversion larger than the relative prudence coeffi-
cient of the logarithmic fund managers always prefer the unskilled fund irrespective
of the skilled funds’ skill level. While in the presence of symmetric or asymmetric
performance fees, the relative risk aversion threshold that separates the clienteles is
affected by the skill level, contract parameters, and market conditions. The result
shows that including a symmetric fee in the manager’s compensation contract could
lead to a higher value of manager’s information to sufficiently risk-averse investors
than that under option-like asymmetric fees. This suggests that investors who are
sufficiently more risk-averse than the manager may choose to include a symmetric per-




A Markov Regime Switching Model for Asset
Allocation
2.1 Introduction
Conventional asset pricing studies use linear factor models with stable coefficients to
examine asset returns and assume that the distribution of returns and pricing factors
does not change over time. However, financial time series often change their pattern
and the abrupt changes can be recurring (e.g., bull versus bear market). There is
substantial empirical evidence of multiple regimes in the distribution of asset returns
(Ang and Bekaert, 2002; Ang and Chen, 2002; Guidolin and Timmermann, 2008;
Turner et al., 1989). Guidolin and Timmermann (2007b) find strong evidence of
state-dependent variations in the joint distribution of returns on market, size, and
value factor portfolios. The risk premia, volatility, and correlations between these
factor portfolios are found to be driven by an underlying state variable. This chapter
further extends the findings to a Markov switching multifactor model and accounts
for the different regime in the idiosyncratic component of asset returns. Such an
extension significantly improves the fit of factor models and yields superior portfolio
performance as explained next.
Our study first documents that the cyclical variations of the idiosyncratic volatility
at the sector level and idiosyncratic volatility series possess substantial common vari-
ations across sectors. These two regimes in the idiosyncratic returns of sector ETFs
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have natural interpretations as the low-volatility and the high-volatility regime. In
addition, we find that the regimes identified from the idiosyncratic returns are differ-
ent from the regimes identified from systematic components of sector ETFs, which are
characterized as the bull, slow-growth, and bear states. This motivates the introduc-
tion of a new regime switching model by decomposing asset returns into idiosyncratic
and systematic components and modeling the two different cycles using two different
Markov chain latent variables. The out-of-sample asset allocation experiment shows
that the economic gains of accounting for regimes in the asset returns are significant
and the proposed regime switching model statistically significantly outperformed tra-
ditional regime switching models with a common state variable.
Markov regime switching models have gained popularity in finance and economic
literature since the seminal work of Hamilton (1989). When applied to equity returns,
regime switching models are well known for their ability to capture many stylized facts
such as fat tails, volatility clustering, skewness, autocorrelation, and time-varying cor-
relations. There are also good economic reasons behind these model and the empirical
findings are compatible with equilibrium models. Whitelaw (2000) considers a general
equilibrium exchange economy with regime shifts in the consumption growth and the
conditional moments of stock returns vary considerably across different states. Ang
and Timmermann (2012) introduce a simple equilibrium model with a regime switch-
ing dividend or consumption growth and show that strong dependence in expected
returns and volatility are endogenously generated.
There is a growing body of literature that studies the implication of regime switch-
ing on asset allocation. For example, Ang and Bekaert (2004) consider the presence of
two regimes in expected equity returns and volatility, and they find that substantial
economic value is added by incorporating regimes into asset allocation. The outper-
formance of the regime switching strategy is largely due to its market timing ability.
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Our study shares some intuition with this paper and extends Ang and Bekaert’s by
considering a more realistic assumption that investors need to infer the unobservable
regimes. (Guidolin and Timmermann, 2007a) study the asset allocation implications
of the regimes in the joint distribution of stock and bond returns. The optimal port-
folio weights vary significantly across the four regimes as investors revise their beliefs
about the state variables. Our study focuses on a different asset allocation problem
to sector ETFs and T-bill. Furthermore, we employ a new Markov switching frame-
work and Bayesian approach for estimation, which makes it possible to deal with
high-dimensional Markov switching models that are very difficult to handle using
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Tu (2010) also uses a Bayesian framework
to study a static portfolio choice problem that takes regime switching into account.
He finds that the economic gains of incorporating regimes are significant irrespective
of concerns about model or parameter uncertainty. In contrast to Tu’s model with a
common Markov chain, asset returns in our study are driven by two different latent
state variables in their idiosyncratic and systematic components, which reflects the
fact the two components have different regime cycles. In addition, we consider the
effects of rebalancing on asset allocation by studying a dynamic problem.
This study is also closely related to a large body of literature that focuses on
idiosyncratic volatility, defined as the residual standard deviation in factor models.
It is documented that the idiosyncratic volatility exhibited cyclical variations (e.g.,
Brandt et al., 2010; Bartram et al., 2016). Bekaert et al. (2012) find that idiosyncratic
volatility can be fitted using a regime-switching autoregressive process with occasional
shifts to a low-volatility or high-volatility regime. Explanations such as fundamental
cash flow variability, business cycle effects, and market aggregate volatility can only
partially explain the regime-switching behavior in idiosyncratic volatility. They argue
that the phenomenon might be related to undiversifiable tail risk in crisis periods and
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it is hard to capture by a linear model. Our analysis shares some intuition and finds
that the non-linear patterns in the idiosyncratic volatility can be well captured by
the new regime switching model.
Another strand of idiosyncratic volatility literature has found that firm-level and
industry-level idiosyncratic volatilities possess a high degree of co-movement and ar-
gue that idiosyncratic volatility is a common pricing factor (e.g., Ang et al., 2006,
2009). Herskovic et al. (2016) argue that idiosyncratic return residuals are priced and
not fully diversifiable due to the presence of non-traded assets, such as human cap-
ital. They develop an incomplete market model with heterogeneous investors whose
consumption growth shares the same volatility structure as firms’ idiosyncratic cash
flow growth. The common idiosyncratic volatility factor becomes the driver of stock
return volatility and dispersion in household earnings growth. A related paper Franco
et al. (2017) add the volatility factor to the standard Fama-French three-factor model
and find increasing the number of factors will impede the model’s interpretability due
to the fact that the volatility factor is highly negatively correlated to the market and
size factor. As an alternative approach, they suggest considering a Markov-switching
framework to improve the explanatory power of the linear multi-factor models. In ad-
dition, we find that adding a volatility factor will not eliminate the regime switching
behavior in the standard deviation of residuals in the extended factor model.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the new
regime switching model. Section 2.3 describes the Gibbs sampling approach to esti-
mating the regime switching parameters and state probabilities of multiple Markov
chains. Section 2.4 conducts an empirical analysis of regimes in the factor portfolios
and idiosyncratic returns of sector ETFs as well as their economic interpretations.
Section 2.5 sets up the investor’s asset allocation problem and Section 2.6 computes
the optimal portfolio weights and presents the asset allocation results. Section 2.7
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conducts a robustness analysis. Conclusions are in Section 2.8.
2.2 A Regime Switching Multi-factor Model
To capture the nonlinear effects in the joint distribution of asset returns and factors,
consider a K×1 vector of benchmark factors, Ft = (F1t, . . . , FKt) and an N×1 vector
of asset returns in excess of the constant T-bill rate, Rt = (R1t, . . . , RNt). Suppose
that the risky asset and factor returns evolve as follows:
Ft = µ(St) + Ω1/2(St)εt, (2.1)
Rt = α(Zt) + β(St)Ft + Σ1/2(Zt)ut (2.2)
where St and Zt are two independent, discrete-time, homogenous, irreducible and
ergodic first-order Markov chains with a finite number of ks and kz regimes and
constant ks× ks transition probability matrix Ps and kz × kz matrix Pz respectively,
whose (i, j)-th elements are given by
Ps(i, j) = Pr(St = i|St−1 = j), i, j = 1, . . . , ks, (2.3)
Pz(i, j) = Pr(Zt = i|Zt−1 = j), i, j = 1, . . . , kz. (2.4)
µ represents a K×1 vector of state-dependent risk premia, α is a N×1 vector of state-
dependent abnormal returns, β is a N ×K matrix of state-dependent factor loading,
(εt,ut)′ ∼ IID N(0, IK+N). The matrix Ω1/2(St) represents the state-dependent





= Ω(St) ≡ V ar[Ft|St]. (2.5)
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Similarly, Σ1/2(Zt) represents the state-dependent Cholesky factorization of the co-





= Σ(Zt) ≡ V ar[rt|Zt]. (2.6)
The residuals rt are relative to the factor model described in Equation 2.2, but
they are not necessarily idiosyncratic or asset-specific. In Section 2.7, we consider an
extensive set of factors, but it shows that the residuals still contain a latent dynamic
component that drives the strong covariation of idiosyncratic volatility. Thus the id-
iosyncratic risk is not fully diversifiable. Possible explanations include undiversifiable
tail risk exposure in crisis periods or the presence of non-traded assets (e.g., Bekaert
et al., 2012; Herskovic et al., 2016). In Section 2.4 we find that the idiosyncratic
returns can be well captured a two-state regime switching process with occasional
shifts to a low-volatility or high-volatility regime, which is in line with the findings of
Bekaert et al. (2012).
Factor portfolios Ft are driven by the state variable St. The state-dependent
mean vector µ(St) and variance-covariance matrix Ω(St) are constant within each
state. We assume that individual risky asset’s factor loadings β(St) are time-varying
and depend on the same Markov chain St in the benchmark factors.1 This allows the
systematic component of asset returns, β(St)Ft(St), is driven by the same Markov
chain, St. The other Markov chain Zt controls the idiosyncratic part of asset returns
and determines the abnormal returns α(Zt) and variance-covariance matrix Σ(Zt) of
idiosyncratic returns.
In this model, investors cannot observe the underlying state variables St or Zt
even at time t. The true states can only be inferred from the realizations of asset and
factor portfolio returns. Thus investors face a portfolio choice problem with partial
1The empirical results in Section 2.4 documents that the factor loadings are statistically signifi-
cantly different across regimes identified from factor returns.
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information.
Existing multivariate regime-switching models usually assumes that a common
regime affects all mean return vector, factor loadings, and variance-covariance matrix
(e.g., Tu, 2010). However, as demonstrated in our empirical findings idiosyncratic
risk does not necessarily share the same latent variable that drives the systematic risk
factors. Idiosyncratic volatility usually accounts for a substantial portion of “total”
volatility and is found to be related to expected returns. It is thus important to
model the different dynamics of idiosyncratic and systematic parts of asset returns.
The proposed Markov regime switching multi-factor model captures this idea and
provides a more powerful framework to conduct performance and risk analysis.
2.3 Estimation of the Model
Most multivariate regime switching studies focus on a very small number of assets
and conduct parameter estimation using the MLE approach. Due to the curse of
dimensionality, it is very difficult to apply MLE to study high-dimensional regime
switching problems. On the other hand, parameter uncertainty is well documented
to have a strong impact on portfolio choice (e.g., Tu and Zhou, 2010; Pastor and Stam-
baugh, 2000). To handle the issues of high-dimensional asset returns and parameter
uncertainty, we propose a Bayesian approach to estimating the new Markov regime
switching model based on Gibbs sampling. The modified MCMC approach provides
a novel way to jointly identify the dynamics of multiple Markov chains and model pa-
rameters.2 Under the Bayesian framework, both the Markov-switching state variables
{St}Tt=1, {Zt}Tt=1 and the model parameters θ ≡ {{αj,Σj}kzj=1, {βi,µi,Ωi}ksi=1,Ps,Pz}
are treated as random variables given the data {Rt,Ft}Tt=1.
A modified Hamilton (1994) filtering algorithm is used to calculate the filtered
2Previous studies usually identify multiple Markov chains one by one with strong assumptions














where It denotes available information at time t, namely realizations of asset and
factor returns up to time t. The filtering algorithm proceeds in two steps: a predic-
tion step and an updating step. In the prediction step, the predicted probability is
computed according to
ξst|t−1 = Psξst−1|t−1 and ξzt|t−1 = Pzξzt−1|t−1.
In the update step, the information in the data at time t is used to update the
predicted estimate via the formula
ξst|t =
(




















where  denotes element by element multiplication and f(Rt,Ft|St, Zt, It−1;θ) is a
ks × kz matrix, whose (i, j)-th element denotes the density of Rt,Ft conditional on
St = i, Zt = j and parameter set θ. The numerators in Equation (2.7)and (2.8) denote
the vector of the joint density f(St,Rt,Ft|It−1;θ) and f(Zt,Rt,Ft|It−1;θ), respec-
tively. The denominator denotes the marginal density f(Rt,Ft|It−1;θ) or likelihood
function. The steady-state probabilities are chosen as the initial value ξs0|0 and ξz0|0 to
start the filter and the two steps are run iteratively to obtain the likelihood function
f(Rt,Ft|It−1;θ) and filtered probabilities sequences ξst|t and ξzt|t for t = 1, . . . , T .
We then need to draw the sequence S̃T = (S1, . . . , ST ) given information at time
T. Following Kim and Nelson (1999), the conditional posterior for the state variable
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is given by




The sampling procedure can proceed in two steps: drawing from g(ST |IT ;θ) and
drawing from g(St|St+1, It;θ). One can first draw ST according to the distribution





where g(St+1|St;θ) is the transition probabilities of St and g(St|It;θ) is the filtered
probabilities ξst|t. Therefore, at time t one calculates
g(St = i|St+1, It;θ) =
g(St+1|St = i;θ)g(St = i|It;θ)∑ks
i=1 g(St+1|St = i;θ)g(St = i|It;θ)
and compares it to a standard uniform random number. The sampling procedure is
repeated for T − 1, . . . , 1 to draw a sequence S̃T from the conditional posterior. The
same procedure applies to draw sample sequences of Z̃T .
The Dirichlet distribution is used as a conjugate prior for each column of the
transition probability matrix Ps. Given the sample sequence S̃T , the conditional
posterior for the jth column of Ps is given by
g(Ps,j|S̃T ) ∼ D(θj1 + ηj1, θj2 + ηj2, . . . , . . . , θjks + ηjks)
where ηji refers to the number of times regime j transits to regime i counted using
S̃T and θj1, . . . , θjks represents the prior parameters. The same procedure applies to
Pz.
Lastly, we need to draw {αj,Σj}kzj=1, {βi,µi,Ωi}ksi=1 given S̃T , Z̃T , IT . The inde-
pendent Normal inverse Wishart prior distribution is used for the regression coeffi-
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cients and variance parameters. Note that both St and Zt affect the inference of these
parameters, one cannot derive the posterior distribution of {αj}kzj=1 and {βi,µi}ksi=1
as two independent parts. Given {Σj}kzj=1, {Ωi}ksi=1, S̃T , Z̃T and IT , one can derive
the posterior distribution of {αj}kzj=1 and {βi,µi}ksi=1 and draw samples. Conditional
on regression coefficients, state variable and the data, the conditional posterior dis-
tribution for {Σj}kzj=1, {Ωi}ksi=1 can also be easily obtained.
Uninformative priors are also considered and robustness checks show that the
results are qualitatively invariant to the different specification of initial values and
priors. Despite using different initial values, the results converge fast and become
virtually the same after a burn-in period of only 1000 iterations. In this study, we
use 20,000 Gibbs samples and discard the first 10,000 as burn in.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Data
Our analysis focuses on the equities, specifically the U.S. sector portfolios which con-
stitute the S&P 500. Since we consider an asset allocation problem, the underlying
instruments should be directly investable. ETFs are ideal instruments for strategic
or tactical asset allocation, and risk hedging. Due to its low expense ratio and high
liquidity, they are suitable for both buy-and-hold investors and active traders. There
are various S&P sector ETFs issued by different asset managers. The SPDR sector
ETFs issued by State Street Global Advisors (SSGA) are used due to its relatively
long trading history (started December 16, 1998), large trading volumes and total
asset under management among similar products. The nine SPDR ETFs include
Consumer Discretionary (XLY), Consumer Staples (XLP), Energy (XLE), Financials
(XLF), Health Care (XLV), Industrials (XLI), Materials (XLB), Technology (XLK),
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and Utilities (XLU).3 The weekly ETF returns data are from CRSP. For the fac-
tor portfolios, we consider the Fama and French’s (1993) three factors: the market
(MKT), the size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML) portfolios. The three-factor
portfolios and one-month Treasury bill rate data are from Ken French’s website. The
excess returns are calculated according to the formula Rj,t = (Pj,t−Pj,t−1)/Pj,t−1−Rft ,
where Pj,t is the index value and Rft is the one-month Treasury bill rate. Our sample
covers the period from December 16, 1998 to September 9, 2016 (924 weeks).
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for the sector ETF and factor portfolio re-
turns. Mean returns are all positive and lie in a range between 0.05% and 0.17% per
week. Their standard deviation ranges from 1.42% to 3.93% per week. All the sector
ETFs and factors portfolio returns have negative skewness and high kurtosis except
that Consumer Discretionary, Financials and HML have positive skewness during the
sample period. According to the Jarque-Bera test, all the sector ETFs and factor
returns are strongly rejected to be normally distributed. There is some evidence of
serial correlation in the MKT, SMB, and HML returns at a weekly frequency. Sec-
tor ETFs also seem to be weakly autocorrelated with the exception of Materials,
Technology, and Utilities sectors. All the time series appear to have time-varying
volatility according to the Engle’s ARCH test. Markov regime-switching models are
well known for their capability to capture heteroskedasticity, fat tails, and negative
skewness in financial time series. The descriptive statistics suggest that they might
be appropriate models to fit the data.
3S&P and MSCI have made numerous changes in the Global Industry Classification Standard
(GICS) over the years. To keep up with these GICS changes, SSGA launched two new sector
ETFs: Communication Services (XLC) and Real Estate (XLRE) in recent years. During the period
(December 16, 1998 to September 9, 2016) we consider, these Sector ETFs have non-overlapping
holdings and divide the S&P into nine index funds.
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Index Mean SD Min Max Skew Kurt JB p-Val. ARCH p-Val. LB-Q p-Val.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Consumer Discretionary 0.15 3.08 -14.74 18.31 0.09 7.19 682.47 0.00 422.60 0.00 22.48 0.01
Consumer Staples 0.09 1.99 -13.35 8.28 -0.56 7.44 816.28 0.00 783.16 0.00 24.42 0.01
Energy 0.17 3.47 -25.21 17.73 -0.54 7.45 815.64 0.00 586.98 0.00 21.94 0.02
Financials 0.08 3.93 -23.97 32.52 0.76 16.18 6809.37 0.00 813.97 0.00 43.71 0.00
Health Care 0.13 2.44 -18.60 9.49 -0.78 9.34 1650.71 0.00 1134.34 0.00 18.12 0.05
Industrials 0.13 2.90 -17.75 13.97 -0.37 6.98 635.64 0.00 560.81 0.00 21.67 0.02
Materials 0.15 3.29 -14.96 15.17 -0.21 5.53 256.05 0.00 428.43 0.00 15.71 0.11
Technology 0.08 3.39 -18.38 14.01 -0.32 5.59 276.53 0.00 458.00 0.00 10.92 0.36
Utilities 0.11 2.41 -19.82 11.82 -0.76 9.40 1676.75 0.00 1122.57 0.00 13.23 0.21
Market 0.10 2.56 -18.00 12.61 -0.56 8.38 1167.96 0.00 704.11 0.00 25.08 0.00
Small Minus Big 0.08 1.42 -10.71 7.00 -0.53 9.82 1846.43 0.00 951.48 0.00 25.11 0.01
High Minus Low 0.05 1.52 -8.68 9.92 0.66 10.56 2279.87 0.00 754.77 0.00 31.07 0.00
XLY XLP XLE XLF XLV XLI XLB XLK XLU MKT SMB HML
Panel B: Correlation
Consumer Discretionary 1.00
Consumer Staples 0.62 1.00
Energy 0.54 0.45 1.00
Financials 0.79 0.56 0.52 1.00
Health Care 0.68 0.60 0.47 0.64 1.00
Industrials 0.83 0.63 0.67 0.78 0.69 1.00
Materials 0.73 0.54 0.72 0.65 0.56 0.83 1.00
Technology 0.70 0.40 0.44 0.58 0.63 0.70 0.54 1.00
Utilities 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.46 0.51 0.53 0.46 0.39 1.00
Market 0.86 0.64 0.67 0.83 0.79 0.89 0.76 0.86 0.57 1.00
Small Minus Big 0.07 -0.14 0.10 -0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.10 0.22 -0.06 0.19 1.00
High Minus Low 0.15 0.11 0.22 0.40 -0.06 0.18 0.24 -0.24 0.13 0.04 -0.23 1.00
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of sector ETF and Fama-French three-factor returns.
The table (Panel A) reports the summary statistics, the normality (Jarque-Bera test),
the autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) (Engle’s ARCH test with lags
up to 4) and autocorrelation (Ljung–Box test with lags up to 10) test statistics and
their corresponding p-values for the 9 sector ETFs and Fama-French three factor
weekly returns over the period of December 16, 1998 to September 9, 2016 (924
weeks). Panel B reports the correlation matrix of these time series.
2.4.2 Regimes in the Joint Process of Factor Returns
Before we study the new regime switching multi-factor model, we first examine the
regimes in the joint process of Fama French three factors as in the following model4:
Ft = µ(St) + Ω1/2(St)εt,
We estimate several specifications of the model for the returns on market, size, and
4Since the market, size, and value factor portfolios are all weakly autocorrelated, we also consider
the presence of autocorrelation terms with up to 2 lags in an unreported result. The parsimonious
MSIH(4) model is still preferred with lowest AIC, BIC, and HQC values.
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value portfolios. A common Markov chain drives the means and variance-covariance
matrix of factor returns. We consider linear and Markov regime switching models with
the number of regimes up to 4. Table 2.2 reports the Akaike information criterion
(AIC), Bayes–Schwartz information criterion (BIC), and Hannan–Quinn information
criterion (HQC) which are used to perform the model selection. For each model we
also show the results of the linearity test proposed by Davies (1977). The linear
model is universally rejected at the 1% level. The four-state MSIH(4) model with
state-dependent mean vector and variance-covariance matrix is selected according
to its lowest AIC, BIC, and HQC values. This specification is consistent with the
empirical finding of Guidolin and Timmermann (2007a) in which they estimate the
Markov switching model using an MLE approach and select a four-state model for
the joint process of monthly returns on the market, size, and value portfolios over a
long period from 1927 to 2001.
Table 2.3 reports the estimates of the linear and four-state models. The first
regime is a highly persistent bull state with an average duration of 92 weeks. In the
first state the market risk premium is 13.54% per annum and statistically significant at
the 0.01 level. The volatilities of all the three factor time series are modest and slightly
smaller than its unconditional value as indicated in Table 2.2. Regime 2 is another
highly persistent transient state with an average duration of 46 weeks, capturing stock
prices during parts of the early 2000s (excluding the periods of dot-com crash). The
market portfolio earns a negative mean return of −3.97% and the SMB and HML have
significantly positive mean returns (11.83%, 9.92%). Hence, both the size and value
effects are strong in this regime. Volatility is close to its unconditional counterpart.
Regime 3 is also a highly persistent transient state with an average duration of 46
weeks. The mean excess return on the market is positive at 6.18%, but not statistically
significantly different from 0. While SMB and HML portfolios have mean returns that
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Model Number of Log-likelihood LR test for AIC BIC HQC
(ks) parameters linearity
Panel A: single-state models
MSI(1) 9 -5471.4126 NA 3.9541 3.9734 3.9611
Panel B: two-state models
MSI(2) 14 -5312.7811 25.2936 (0.0000) 3.8469 3.8875 3.8616
MSIH(2) 20 -5033.0321 131.3358 (0.0000) 3.6328 3.6885 3.6463
Panel C: three-state models
MSI(3) 21 -5237.0608 89.0048 (0.0000) 3.7937 3.8386 3.8099
MSIH(3) 33 -4933.2552 161.9122 (0.0000) 3.5832 3.6537 3.6086
Panel D: four-state models
MSI(4) 30 -5268.7246 98.6318 (0.0000) 3.8230 3.8872 3.8462
MSIH(4) 48 -4862.9326 189.9056 (0.0000) 3.5432 3.6459 3.5803
Table 2.2: Selection of multivariate regime switching model for Market, SMB and
HML returns. The table reports the log-likelihood, and the linearity test results,
and Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC),
Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQC) for the multivariate Markov switching
models: Ft = µ(St) + Ω1/2(St)εt with ks = 1, 2, 3, 4. The sample period is from De-
cember 16, 1998 to September 9, 2016 (924 weeks). The models’ acronyms are as fol-
lows: MS represents Markov Switching, I represents the presence of regime-dependent
intercept, H represents the presence of regime-dependent variance-covariance matrix
(heteroskedasticity).
are not significantly different from 0. Another difference between regime 2 and 3 lies
in their correlation matrix. In regime 2, both the SMB and HML portfolios provide
hedging to the market portfolio, while in regime 3 both the SMB and HML portfolios
are positively correlated with the market. Regime 4 is a high-volatility crisis regime
with an annualized volatility of 38.31% for market, 21.88% for size portfolio and,
26.25% for value portfolio, which double or triple their corresponding average value.
All the market, size and value premia are negative (−32.31%,−3.13%,−2.67%) but
not precisely estimated. This state captures the periods of two recent major crisis:
the dot-com bubble and 2008 financial crisis.
To further illustrate the economic interpretation of these states, Figure 2·1 plots
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Panel A: Single State Model
Market Portfolio SMB Portfolio HML Portfolio
1.Mean 0.0533 0.0405∗ 0.0266
2.Correlations/Volatilities
Market Portfolio 0.1848∗∗∗
SMB Portfolio 0.1893∗∗∗ 0.1024∗∗∗
HML Portfolio 0.0369 -0.2289∗∗∗ 0.1098∗∗∗
Panel B: Four State Model
Market Portfolio SMB Portfolio HML Portfolio
1.Mean
Regime 1 0.1521∗∗∗ 0.0297 0.0426∗∗
Regime 2 -0.0397 0.1183∗∗ 0.0992∗
Regime 3 0.0618 0.0083 -0.0517




SMB Portfolio 0.4386∗∗∗ 0.0723∗∗∗
HML Portfolio -0.0100 -0.1489∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗
Regime 2
Market Portfolio 0.1829∗∗∗
SMB Portfolio -0.1592∗∗ 0.1074∗∗∗
HML Portfolio -0.5998 -0.2011∗∗∗ 0.1277∗∗∗
Regime 3
Market Portfolio 0.1902∗∗∗
SMB Portfolio 0.3901∗∗∗ 0.0894∗∗∗
HML Portfolio 0.2933∗∗∗ 0.0667 0.0912∗∗∗
Regime 4
Market Portfolio 0.3831∗∗∗
SMB Portfolio 0.1484 0.2188∗∗∗
HML Portfolio 0.2870∗∗ -0.4583∗∗∗ 0.2625∗∗∗
Regime 1 Regime2 Regime 3 Regime 4
3.Transition matrix
Regime1 0.9892∗∗∗ 0.0050 0.0201∗ 0.0003
Regime2 0.0001 0.9728∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0670∗
Regime3 0.0107∗ 0.0001 0.9728∗∗∗ 0.0214
Regime4 0.0000 0.0221∗ 0.0070 0.9112∗∗∗
* significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%.
Table 2.3: Parameter estimates of single and four-state multivariate Markov regime-
switching model for Market, SMB and HML returns. The model is Ft = µ(St) +
Ω1/2(St)εt with ks = 4. The sample period is from December 16, 1998 to September


































































































































































































Figure 2·1: Smoothed probabilities from four-state Markov regime switching joint
model for Market Portfolio, SMB and HML returns. The figure plots the smoothed
probabilities of regime 1 (bull regime), regime 2 (transient regime), regime 3 (transient
regime) and regime 4 (crisis regime) estimated from the MSIH(4) multivariate model
Ft = µ(St) + Ω1/2(St)εt comprising the weekly return series on Fama and French’s
(1993) three factors: MKT, SMB and HML. The sample period is from 12-31-1998
to 9-9-2016 (924 weeks).
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the smoothed probability for the four-state Markov switching multivariate model. In
particular, the bottom right plot in Figure 2·1 shows that the probability of Regime 4
spikes up during major crashes and declines in U.S. equity markets, such as bursting of
dot-com bubble and 2008 financial crisis. The empirical findings suggest that a naive
two-state (bull and bear) model might not be good enough to capture the different
patterns and cycles in the dynamics of factor portfolio returns and a four-state regime
switching model provides a better fit to the factor returns data.
2.4.3 Abnormal Return and Idiosyncratic Volatility of Individual Sector
Previous subsection demonstrated the presence of regimes in the market, size, and
value factors. In order to investigate the dynamics of the idiosyncratic component of
sector j, we characterize the sector j as
Rj,t = αj(Zj,t) +
K∑
i=1
βij(St)Fi,t(St) + σj(Zj,t)uj,t, j = 1, . . . , N. (2.9)
Following Billio et al. (2010), we consider a two-step approach5. In the first step, we
identify St using factor returns as in subsection 2.4.2 and its estimate equals to the
state with the highest smoothed probability
Ŝt = arg max
i∈{1,...,ks}
Pr(St = i|F1, . . . ,FT ), t = 1, . . . , T.
Conditional on this result, in the second step we can estimate the univariate regime-
switching model described by Equation 2.9 and identify the latent state variable Zj,t
and other parameters.
The estimation results of regime-dependent abnormal return and idiosyncratic
5Alternatively, we can jointly identify the state variables Sj , t and Zj,t using the algorithm de-
scribed in Section 2.3. The dynamics of Zj,t are very similar. For each sector j, Zj,t can be well
described by a low-volatility and high-volatility regime. ks = 3 is selected for all sectors when we
take into account the impact of regime-dependent factor loadings to determine the regime in the
systematic part of sector returns.
22
volatility for different sector ETFs using the two-step approach are reported in Ta-
ble 2.4. In all cases linearity is strongly rejected. We find that Markov regime
switching models with two regimes are chosen according to the lowest BIC value for
most sector ETFs’ idiosyncratic returns except that a three-state model is slightly
preferred for Utilities. The two states have a natural interpretation as a low-volatility
regime (Zj,t = 1) and a high-volatility regime (Zj,t = 2). Both the two states are
highly persistent for most sectors. The low-volatility regime is highly persistent for
all the sectors with an average duration of 186.66 weeks and the high-volatility regime
is also very persistent with an average duration of 66.98 weeks. For all sector ETFs
the high volatility estimate σ2 is at least twice the low volatility estimate σ1. The
volatility estimate of the nine sector ETFs in the idiosyncratic high volatility regime
on average equals 18.05% per annum which is larger than two times the amount 7.30%
per annum in the idiosyncratic low volatility regime. Moreover, the mean idiosyn-
cratic returns are not statistically different from zero with exceptions that Consumer
Staple and Utilities are associated with a mean return of 3.98% and 8.70% per annum
respectively and Financials has a negative mean return of −3.93% in the low volatility
regime.
The idiosyncratic volatilities of all sector ETFs seem to exhibit a strong degree
of common time variations and very similar regime pattern. Figure 2·2 plots the
smoothed probabilities of being in the high-volatility regime for each sector ETF’s
idiosyncratic returns. As reported in Table 2.5, the average correlation between dif-
ferent ETF idiosyncratic regime cycles is 68.60% and the average concordance index
is 82.50%.6 This implies that volatilities of residuals share a common regime after













where Zi,t and Zj,t are two regime processes with binary states. The concordance index equals
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Consumer Consumer Energy Financials Health Industrials Materials Technology Utilities
Discretionary Staples Care
α1 -0.0006 0.0398 0.0223 -0.0393 0.0297 0.0079 0.0021 0.0039 0.0870
α2 0.1002 -0.0165 0.0382 -0.0036 0.0621 0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0002 -0.1123
σ1 0.0571 0.0623 0.1109 0.0601 0.0648 0.0543 0.0883 0.0598 0.0996
σ2 0.1875 0.1570 0.2304 0.1705 0.1378 0.1304 0.2386 0.1602 0.2117
p11 0.9928 0.9982 0.9918 0.9914 0.9912 0.9941 0.9850 0.9972 0.9752
p22 0.9776 0.9923 0.9883 0.9763 0.9856 0.9846 0.9543 0.9924 0.9221
Table 2.4: Two-state regime-switching model for individual ETF’s idiosyncratic re-
turns. The table reports the estimation results for a two-state regime-switching
model for ETF idiosyncratic returns. The estimated model is Rj,t = αj(Zj,t) +∑K
i=1 βij(Ŝt)Fi,t + σj(Zj,t)uj,t, where Fi,t are the systematic risk factors, Ŝt is a four-
state Markov chain identified using factor returns in the first step, Zj,t is also a
two-state Markov chain (Regime 1 represents a low volatility idiosyncratic regime
and Regime 2 represents a high volatility idiosyncratic regime), σ1 (σ2) is a Sector
ETF’s idiosyncratic volatility in low (high) idiosyncratic volatility state, p11 (p22)
represents an idiosyncratic Markov chain’s transition probability of staying in its low
(high) volatility state. Parameters marked in bold are statistically significant at the
95% confidence level. The sample period is from 12-31-1998 to 9-9-2016 (924 weeks).
Consumer Consumer Energy Financials Health Industrials Materials Technology Utilities
Discretionary Staples Care
Consumer Discretionary 0.89 0.81 0.87 0.89 0.97 0.87 0.91 0.84
Consumer Staples 0.90 0.87 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.74 0.74 0.67
Energy 0.62 0.67 0.77 0.83 0.89 0.88 0.78 0.83
Financials 0.76 0.72 0.58 0.85 0.87 0.80 0.87 0.76
Health 0.76 0.79 0.57 0.70 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.84
Industrials 0.92 0.94 0.65 0.79 0.77 0.85 0.80 0.80
Materials 0.74 0.71 0.54 0.75 0.65 0.80 0.84 0.76
Technology 0.73 0.84 0.51 0.57 0.79 0.76 0.59 0.69
Utilities 0.67 0.64 0.41 0.66 0.60 0.64 0.54 0.50
Table 2.5: Correlations and Concordance indices of the high-volatility regimes in
individual sector ETF idiosyncratic returns. The correlation parameters are reported
in lower triangular and the concordance values are reported in the upper triangular.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2·2: Smoothed probabilities of being in a high-volatility state for individual sec-
tor ETFs’ idiosyncratic returns under a two-state Markov regime-switching univariate
model. The estimated model is Rj,t = αj(Zj,t) +
∑K
i=1 βij(Ŝt)Fi,t + σj(Zj,t)uj,t,, where
Fi,t are the systematic risk factors, St is a four-state Markov chain identified using
factor returns in the first-step, Zj,t is also a two-state Markov chain (Regime 1 repre-
sents a low volatility idiosyncratic regime and Regime 2 represents a high volatility
idiosyncratic regime). The sample period is from 12-31-1998 to 9-9-2016 (924 weeks).
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removing the common factors from returns and accounting for state-dependent factor
loading. This finding is consistent with Herskovic et al. (2016), in which they find both
firm-level and industry-level idiosyncratic volatilities display an extraordinary degree
of co-movement. The high correlation and strong synchronization of idiosyncratic
regimes indicate that it is appropriate to use a common two-state Markov chain to
characterize the joint distribution of the idiosyncratic component of 9 sectors’ returns.
2.4.4 A Joint Model for Sector ETF and Factor Returns
Motivated by the observations that there exist different state variables in the system-
atic risk factor returns and idiosyncratic component of sector ETFs, we consider the
new Markov regime switching multi-factor model (2.1)-(2.2) and examine models with
a combination of a different number of regimes in the systematic and idiosyncratic
components. For comparison, we study the traditional regime-switching multi-factor
models with a common Markov chain for both the idiosyncratic and systematic parts.
BIC is used to perform model selection. We also test the linear model against the
regime switching models under consideration. The saturation ratio, measured as the
total number of observations divided by the total number of model parameters, is
also reported.
Table 2.6 presents the outcome of this analysis. It is perhaps unsurprising that the
linear model is universally strongly rejected at the significance level of 1%. The log-
likelihood increases as the number of parameters increase. BIC values indicate that
the new regime switching model with kz = 2, ks = 3 has the best trade-off between in-
sample fit and model parsimony. The results indicate that the new regime switching
model with kz = 2, ks = 3 is a competitive model to fit the joint process of the 9
sector ETFs, market, size and value portfolios.
1 when two cycles are perfectly synchronized and returns a value of 0 when they are perfectly
negatively synchronized. For two independent cycles, Î has an expected value close to 0.5.
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Model Number of Saturation Log-likelihood LR test for BIC
parameters ratio linearity
Linear multi-factor 90 123.20 -20593 NA 3.790
Two-state multi-factor 182 60.92 -18493 4200 (0.00) 3.489
Three-state multi-factor 276 40.17 -18141 4904 (0.00) 3.504
Four-state multi-factor 372 29.81 -17982 5222 (0.00) 3.556
New model (kz = 2, ks = 2) 184 60.26 -18497 4192 (0.00) 3.491
New model (kz = 2, ks = 3) 224 49.50 -18263 4660 (0.00) 3.482
New model (kz = 2, ks = 4) 266 41.68 -18159 4868 (0.00) 3.499
New model (kz = 3, ks = 3) 282 39.32 -18095 4996 (0.00) 3.501
Table 2.6: Selection of regime switching model for nine sector ETFs and factor re-
turns. The table reports the log-likelihood, and the linearity test results, and Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) for the new Markov regime switching model and tradi-
tional Markov regime switching multi-factor models with a common Markov chain.
kz represents the number of regimes in the idiosyncratic returns and ks represents
the number of regimes in the systematic parts of asset returns. The sample period is
from December 16, 1998 to September 9, 2016 (924 weeks).
Table 2.7 presents the estimates of the new model with kz = 2, ks = 3. As in the
previous subsection, it is straightforward to interpret the two idiosyncratic regimes.
The first idiosyncratic state is a moderately persistent regime with an average du-
ration of 20.88 weeks and it is characterized by low volatility and relatively higher
correlation among ETF idiosyncratic returns. The second idiosyncratic state is a less
persistent high-volatility regime with an average duration of 10.95 weeks and the id-
iosyncratic volatility for each ETF within this state is twice or triple the magnitude
of that within the low-volatility regime.
It is relatively less straightforward to interpret the three regimes for the system-
atic components. Regime 1 is a ‘bull’ regime characterized by large, positive market
and size risk premia and low volatility for factor portfolios. Market and size factor
portfolios have statistically significant mean returns of 9.57% and 4.03% per annum
respectively. Value factor also has a positive mean return of 1.44%, but not statis-
tically significant. The bull regime is a moderately persistent state and on average






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2·3: Smoothed probabilities: the new regime switching model for 9 sector ETFs
and Fama-French 3 factor returns with 2 states for the idiosyncratic component and
3 states for the systematic component. The figure plots the smoothed probabilities
of two regimes in the nine sector ETFs’ idiosyncratic return and three regimes in the
ETFs’ systematic exposures and Fama French three factors estimated from the model
Ft = µ(St) + Ω1/2(St)εt,
Rt = α(Zt) + β(St)Ft + Σ1/2(Zt)ut,
where Zt is a two-state Markov chain characterizing the idiosyncratic components of
ETFs with regime 1 corresponding to a low-volatility state and regime 2 corresponding
to a high-volatility sate. St is a three-state Markov chain characterizing the Fama
French 3 factors and sector ETFs’ systematic exposure with regime 1 corresponding
to a bull state, regime 2 corresponding to a slow-growth state with slow economic
growth and above-average volatility, regime 3 corresponding to a bear state with
high volatility. St is independent from Zt. The sample period is from12-31-1998 to
9-9-2016 (924 weeks).
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exposure to the size factor in this state. Regime 2 is a ‘slow-growth’ state character-
ized by above-average volatility for factor portfolios and small positive mean market
excess return of 3.33%. The size and value factors have large, positive risk premia, but
they are not precisely estimated. The volatilities of the factor portfolios are around
twice the amount of those in the bull regime. This state has low persistence with
an average duration of 4.81 weeks. The value portfolio exhibits a strong negative
correlation with the market in this state. Regime 3 is a ‘bear’ regime characterized
by high volatility and large, negative mean excess return on the market. The size
and value risk premia are not significant in this state. The bear state is not very
persistent with an average duration of 7 weeks.
Figure 2·3 plots the smoothed probabilities of the 2-state Zt in the joint process
of idiosyncratic ETF returns and those of the 3-state St that drives the factors and
ETFs’ systematic risk exposure. The bear regime includes the economic effects in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the stock market downturn of 2002, US bear
market of 2007-2009, 2011 stock markets fall. The slow-growth state mainly covers
the weak economic growth period of the US from 2000-2002. Both the idiosyncratic
and market volatilities peak up in the state. The bull regime includes the market
upturn periods not included in the other two states and takes up 74.35% of the
periods considered.
2.4.5 Out-of-Sample Analysis of the Markov Regime Switching Models
Subsection 2.4.4 demonstrates that the new Markov regime switching provides a good
in-sample fit to the joint process of 9 sector portfolios and Fama-French three factors.
In this subsection, we conduct an out-of-sample analysis to examine the model’s pre-
dictability. The first estimation window ranges from December 31, 1998 to November
23, 2007, while the forecasting period ranges from November 30, 2007 to September
23, 2011, a total of 200 weeks. An expanding window is used to estimate the regime
31
New model Two-state Three-state
(kz = 2, ks = 3) Regime Switching Regime Switching
In-Sample Out-of-Sample In-Sample Out-of-Sample In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Consumer Discretionary 1.6130 1.5374 1.6353 1.7043 1.6076 1.7338
Consumer Staples 1.5901 1.2199 1.6337 1.2832 1.6193 1.2842
Energy 2.5612 2.7131 2.5891 3.0018 2.5537 2.9717
Financials 1.3862 2.0422 1.4470 2.1852 1.3947 2.2164
Health Care 1.4310 1.6611 1.4526 1.6511 1.4311 1.6672
Industrials 1.2853 1.3013 1.3135 1.4074 1.2955 1.4342
Materials 2.0717 1.9656 2.1338 2.3731 2.1041 2.3617
Technology 1.7730 1.3044 1.8177 1.2556 1.7798 1.2653
Utilities 1.9189 2.1924 1.9310 2.2642 1.9102 2.2497
Average 1.7708 1.7367 1.9029 1.7726 1.9094 1.7440
Table 2.8: Root mean square error (%) of Markov regime switching models for in-
sample and out-of sample fitting. The table reports the in-sample and out-of-sample
RMSE for the new Markov regime switching model with ks = 3, kz = 2 and the
conventional Markov regime switching model with k = 2 and k = 3. The in-sample
period is from December 16, 1998 to November 23, 2007 and the out-of-sample period
is from November 30, 2007 to September 23, 2011, on a weekly basis.







(Rj,t+1 − R̂j,t+1))2, j = 1, . . . , N,
where R̂j,t+1 represents the projected return for sector j at time t+ 1. For the tradi-









where k represents the number of regimes for the common state variable St and
P̂ (St+1 = i|It; θ̂t) represents the predicted probability. Similarly, for the new Markov










The analysis focuses on the performance of the new Markov regime switching
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model with ks = 3, kz = 2 and the conventional Markov regime switching model with
k = 2 and 3, which perform relatively well in the in-sample fitting as in Subsec-
tion 2.4.4. Table 2.8 shows the performance of the Markov regime switching models
in both the in-sample and out-of-sample fitting. The differences between the true and
predicted returns under all the Markov regime switching models are small. The new
Markov regime switching model generally has slightly smaller RMSE than those of
the conventional Markov regime switching models. The out-of-sample RMSE under
the new model is very close to its in-sample counterpart. The new model’s advan-
tage is more evident in terms of out-of-sample RMSE. This implies that the new
Markov regime switching model not only provides good in-sample fit, it can also be
generalizable to future data.
2.5 Asset Allocation under Regime Switching
This section studies the implications of the new regime switching multi-factor model
on asset allocation. We consider an investor, who has a power utility function with
a coefficient of relative risk aversion γ and investment horizon T , derives utility from





1− γ . (2.10)
The investor aims to maximize his expected utility by choosing at time t the
optimal weights ωt among the nine sector ETFs, while 1 − ω′tιN is invested in the
riskless T-bills. For simplicity, the investor is assumed to have a unit initial wealth
and have no intermediate consumption.8 His portfolio weights are rebalanced every
ϕ = T
B
weeks at B equally spaced dates t, t + T
B
, . . . , (B − 1) T
B
. When B = 1 and
7For tractability consideration, the power utility function is usually a benchmark in asset alloca-
tion literature and enables comparison to previous studies.
8The investor’s decision for saving is thus effectively exogenously specified.
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ϕ = T , the problem collapses to a static one and the investor implements a buy-and-
hold strategy.
Denote by ωtb (b = 0, 1, . . . , B − 1) the portfolio weights allocated to the risky



















ωjtb ≥ 0 (2.13)
whereRtb,tb+1 ≡
∑ϕ
j=1Rtb+j represents the vector of excess returns on the sector ETFs,
continuously compounded over the period tb to tb+1. Short-selling is not allowed.9
The derived utility of wealth at the rebalancing date tb is given by










where θtb = ({αj,tb ,Σj,tb}kzj=1, {µi,tb ,βi,tbΩi,tb}ksi=1,Ps,tb ,Pz,tb) denotes the parameters
of the Markov regime switching model, ytb = (Rtb ,Ftb) denotes the returns, πs,tb and
πz,tb represent the vector of filtered probabilities for St and Zt respectively conditional
on the information up to time tb. Under power utility, the derived utility of wealth
can be simplified to (see Ingersoll, 1987 for details)
J(Wtb ,ytb ,θtb ,πs,tb ,πz,tb , tb) =
W 1−γtb
1− γ Q(ytb ,θtb ,πs,tb ,πz,tb , tb), b = 0, . . . , B−1, γ 6= 1.
Note that the underlying states are unobservable. Therefore, investors need to infer
9The asset allocation results allowing for short-selling are qualitatively similar.
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, b = 0, . . . , B − 1.










a ks×kz matrix whose (i, j)-th element is the density of ytb+1 at time tb+1 conditional




















Remark. In the regime switching setup, investors are facing a time-varying in-
vestment environment driven by unobservable state variables. In addition to myopic
demand, the hedging demand arises as investors update their belief about the proba-
bilities of underlying state variables. Thus, investors’ optimal portfolio choices should
not only depend on the future value of the asset returns ytb but also on the future
perception of the probability of being in the each of the underlying state πtb+1(θ̂tb)
conditional on information up to time tb.
2.5.1 Numerical Solutions
Previous studies have proposed a variety of approaches to solving the asset allocation
problem. Barberis (2000) uses simulation methods to compute the optimal buy-and-
hold and rebalancing strategies for investors with long horizons. Ang and Bekaert
(2002) and Lynch (2001) employ quadrature methods to find the optimal portfolio
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policies for an investor. Some papers derive approximate solutions to the portfolio
choice problem for infinitely-lived investors (e.g., Campbell et al., 2003; Campbell and
Viceira, 1999). Wachter (2002) have derived a closed-form solution for the optimal
portfolio choice problem under complete markets and mean-reverting returns.
In contrast to the observable states in Ang and Bekaert (2002), in our model
investors need to infer about the underlying state and quadrature methods cannot
be used to solve our problem. To solve for the optimal allocation weights accounting
for investor’s learning, one common approach is to approximate the integral in the
expected utility functional using Monte Carlo simulation as used in Barberis (2000),















where Rit,t+T denotes the i-th Monte Carlo simulation sample of the excess return
vector from time t to t+T . We use Ns = 10, 000 and a variety of investment horizon,
T = 1 to 260 weeks.
2.6 Asset Allocation Results
In the section, we first study the buy-and-hold asset allocation strategy of an investor
who solves the portfolio choice problem once at time t. Then, we introduce rebalanc-
ing and examine the out-of-sample asset allocation results. Investment horizon varies
from 1 week to 5 years. Following (Guidolin and Timmermann, 2007a), the investor’s
coefficient of relative risk aversion γ is initially set to 5.
2.6.1 Optimal asset allocation in different regimes
As discussed in Subsection 2.4.4, the regimes in the idiosyncratic returns of sector
ETFs have economic interpretations as low-volatility and high-volatility states, and
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low-volatility idiosyncratic state (Z
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Figure 2·4: Optimal weights as a function of the investment horizon starting from
different regimes. The graph plots a buy-and-hold investor’s optimal asset allocation
to the 9 sector ETFs and T-bills as a function of investment horizon within different
combinations of idiosyncratic and systematic regime. The investor’s relative risk
aversion coefficient is set at γ = 5.
37
systematic regimes have economic interpretations as bull, slow-growth, and crash
states. Figure 2·4 shows the optimal asset allocation for a buy-and-holder investor
starting from each of the states, i.e. (πz,t = ei,πs,t = ej) with i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, 3,
but allowing for uncertainty about future regimes due to random regime switching.
Given the large differences in the joint distribution of asset returns across regimes,
it is perhaps unsurprising that the probabilities of the initial states have a strong
impact on portfolio weights.
The bull systematic state is associated with high mean returns and low volatility
for benchmark factor portfolios. The demand for sector ETFs starts at 100% at
the shortest horizon and declines to around 45% at horizons for horizons greater
than 1 year. Sectors including Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy,
Health Care, Utilities are selected within the low-volatility idiosyncratic and bull
systematic state. The demand for Health Care emerges at the investment horizon
greater than 6 months. The idiosyncratic regime also has a significant impact on the
allocation among sector ETFs. Portfolios are more diversified composing of Consumer
Discretionary, Energy, Financial, Health Care and Technology at the shortest horizon
within the high-volatility idiosyncratic and bull systematic state. As idiosyncratic
returns start from the high-volatility state the weight on the Utilities sector becomes
zero at short horizons and rises to 5% at long horizons.
In the slow growth state, the total weight on sector ETFs tends to be smaller than
that under the bull systematic state and declines faster as the investment horizon
grows. Energy, Health Care, and Materials are chosen at short horizons for the high-
volatility idiosyncratic and slow-growth systematic state. As the idiosyncratic regime
shifts to the low-volatility one, the demand for Utilities sector takes up a significant
portion.
Finally, starting from the bear systematic state, 100% of the portfolio is allocated
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to T-bills at the shortest horizon. The proportion invested in ETFs gradually rises
from 0% to 35% as the investment horizon is extended from 1 week to 5 years.
The Utilities sector takes up around 10% of the portfolio with horizons longer than 3
months within the low-volatility idiosyncratic state. Its share in the optimal portfolio,
to a large extent, is replaced by Health Care when the idiosyncratic returns evolve
into the high-volatility regime.
2.6.2 Out-of-sample performance
A legitimate concern about the results is that although the regime switching model
may produce good in-sample fits and sensible portfolio choices, the parameter estima-
tion errors could lead to implausible and poorly determined portfolio weights when
the model is used on real-time data.
To address both the concerns of model misspecification and parameter estimation
error, we study how well the new regime switching model performs out-of-sample via
recursive estimation and asset allocation experiment. The first estimation window
is from December 31, 1998 to November 23, 2007. Using these estimates and in-
ferred state probabilities, one can solve for the optimal portfolio weights at various
investment horizons. An expanding estimation window is used to estimate the model
and select the portfolio weights. We choose a sufficiently long evaluation period from
November 30, 2007 to September 23, 2011, a total of 200 weeks. Note that this pe-
riod covers the unprecedented 2008 financial crisis and the recovery period after the
recession.
We compare the investment performance of a traditional two-state regime switch-
ing multi-factor model, a three-state regime switching multi-factor model, a new
regime switching model with kz = 2, ks = 3, and a simple linear multi-factor model.10
10In order to preclude any benefits of hindsight about the optimal number of regimes, we determine
the optimal number of regimes using real-time data and a flexible model with kz = 2, ks = 3 is still
selected according to the lowest BIC value for the period considered.
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As illustrated in Figure 2·5, regime switching lead to very different portfolio weights
depending on the inferred state probabilities at a short horizon of 1 week. Rela-
tive to traditional regime switching multi-factor models, the new regime switching
model tends to take more defensive positions and invests more in T-bills during mar-
ket turmoil. While investing aggressively in a bull state, the new regime switching
model puts a larger weight on the Energy sector than the three-state regime switching
multi-factor model.
Following (Guidolin and Timmermann, 2007a) and (Tu, 2010) we use the certainty
equivalent return (CER) as our performance measure. To account for the effect of
the coefficient of relative risk aversion on investment performance, we consider two
scenarios with risk aversion γ = 5 and γ = 10. Table 2.9 reports the investment per-
formance for a buy-and-hold investor with various horizons, T = 1, 4, 26, 52, 156, 260
weeks. The results show that the new model with ki = 2, ks = 3 significantly out-
performed other competing models at the short horizon with T = 1, 4 weeks. The
certainty equivalent return of the flexible model is around 2-6% higher than that of
the second-best model at these short horizons. To access its statistical significance,
we do a block bootstrap experiment (50,000 trials) for the empirical distribution of
CER to account for the potential serial dependence in the CER time series. The
block bootstrap results show that the new regime switching model performs statis-
tically significantly outperformed the other models over the short horizons T = 1, 4
at the 90% confidence level for both cases of γ = 5 and γ = 10.11 As the investment
horizon increases, the regime switching models all outperform the linear model at
intermediate horizon T = 26, 52 weeks and the three-regime multi-factor model per-
forms the best. But there seems no evidence that the regime switching buy-and-hold
strategies outperforms the myopic strategy at long horizons T = 156, 260 weeks. This
11Two exceptions that have p-value slightly higher than 10% are the two-state model with γ = 5,
T = 1 and the linear model with γ = 10, T = 1.
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might be due to the fact that the regime switching model’s predictability through the
persistence of regimes weakens as the investment horizon increases.
2.6.3 Rebalancing
Now consider a dynamic asset allocation problem that portfolio weights can be re-
balanced every ϕ = T
B
weeks at B equally spaced dates. Table 2.10 reports the
investment performance for an investor allowing for weekly rebalancing (B = T ) dur-
ing the out-of-sample evaluation periods from December 7, 2008 to September 23,
2011 (200 weeks).12 The results show that the new model with kz = 2, ks = 3 out-
performed the other models in terms of CER for γ = 5, 10 and investment horizons
spanning from 1 week to 5 years, with the exception of γ = 10, T = 156, 260 weeks,
the three-state regime switching multi-factor model has slightly higher CER. The
same procedure for block bootstrap is conducted on the CER time series to assess the
statistical significance of the outperformance. The analysis of block bootstrap shows
that the risk-adjusted outperformance of the new regime switching model is statis-
tically significant at the 90% confidence interval in most cases. Both the new and
traditional two-state regime switching multi-factor model statistically significantly
outperformed the linear multi-factor model at intermediate to long investment hori-
zons (T=26, 52, 156, 260) weeks, which highlights the significant economic gains for
incorporating regimes in portfolio decisions.
The outperformance of the new regime switching model over the traditional two-
state regime switching model might be due to the fact that the new model better
fits the dynamics of asset returns. Figure 2·5 shows that the portfolio weights under
the new regime switching model change abruptly as the underlying state variable
probabilities change while other models do not detect the shift in the underlying
state. For example, the new regime switching strategy holds a significant amount of
12The dynamic asset allocation with monthly rebalancing yields qualitatively similar results.
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Model Mean CER ∆CER p-value Mean CER ∆CER p-value
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
γ = 5 γ = 10
Panel A: T = 1 week
Linear multi-factor -2.13 -5.62 -7.61 0.09 -0.77 -2.51 -3.01 0.17
Two-state multi-factor 4.63 -3.71 -5.70 0.14 1.69 -3.21 -3.71 0.09
Three-state multi-factor -2.43 -7.97 -9.96 0.02 -0.39 -7.21 -7.71 0.02
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) 5.75 1.99 NA NA 2.61 0.50 NA NA
Panel B: T = 4 weeks
Linear multi-factor -2.59 -7.28 -7.31 0.07 -1.02 -3.28 -3.48 0.10
Two-state multi-factor 0.89 -4.49 -4.52 0.10 0.03 -3.22 -3.42 0.09
Three-state multi-factor 0.54 -3.06 -3.09 0.09 0.58 -2.14 -2.34 0.10
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) 2.33 0.03 NA NA 1.36 0.20 NA NA
Panel C: T = 26 weeks
Linear multi-factor -1.56 -7.34 -2.97 0.01 -0.54 -3.16 -1.78 0.16
Two-state multi-factor -0.88 -5.99 -2.62 0.05 -0.23 -2.57 -1.19 0.22
Three-state multi-factor 0.19 -2.33 1.04 0.02 0.32 -0.88 0.50 0.07
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) -0.86 -3.37 NA NA -0.21 -1.38 NA NA
Panel D: T = 52 weeks
Linear multi-factor -0.87 -4.51 -1.96 0.03 -0.31 -1.92 -0.94 0.15
Two-state multi-factor -0.67 -3.33 -0.78 0.08 -0.18 -1.39 -0.41 0.19
Three-state multi-factor -0.15 -1.85 0.70 0.01 0.07 -0.69 0.29 0.04
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) -0.75 -2.55 NA NA -0.04 -0.98 NA NA
Panel E: T = 156 weeks
Linear multi-factor 3.21 2.76 0.57 0.00 1.99 1.57 0.07 0.12
Two-state multi-factor 2.74 2.43 0.24 0.00 1.72 1.39 -0.11 0.08
Three-state multi-factor 2.47 2.21 0.02 0.38 2.66 1.44 -0.06 0.08
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) 2.44 2.19 NA NA 2.59 1.50 NA NA
Panel E: T = 260 weeks
Linear multi-factor 2.40 1.84 0.34 0.00 2.11 1.10 -0.32 0.00
Two-state multi-factor 2.00 1.62 0.12 0.00 3.49 1.18 -0.24 0.01
Three-state multi-factor 1.74 1.45 -0.05 0.15 5.13 1.59 0.17 0.36
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) 1.82 1.50 NA NA 4.45 1.42 NA NA
Table 2.9: Out-of-sample performance of a buy-and-hold investor under various mod-
els The investment period includes 200 periods from December 7, 2008 to September
23, 2011. The table displays the annualized mean return and certainty equivalent re-
turn (CER) of investment performance under various models. ∆CER equals the CER
of a model minus that of the new regime switching model and the p-value measures
the significance level of the difference obtained through the bootstrap experiments
with 50,000 trails. Performance statistics are boldfaced when these are the best.
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Model Mean CER ∆CER p-value Mean CER ∆CER p-value
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
γ = 5 γ = 10
Panel A: T = 1 week
Linear multi-factor -2.13 -5.62 -7.61 0.09 -0.77 -2.51 -3.01 0.17
Two-state multi-factor 4.63 -3.71 -5.70 0.14 1.69 -3.21 -3.71 0.09
Three-state multi-factor -2.43 -7.97 -9.96 0.02 -0.39 -7.21 -7.71 0.02
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) 5.75 1.99 NA NA 2.61 0.50 NA NA
Panel B: T = 4 weeks
Linear multi-factor -2.05 -5.76 -7.64 0.07 -0.75 -2.58 -3.22 0.17
Two-state multi-factor 3.66 -3.29 -5.17 0.10 1.12 -3.11 -3.75 0.09
Three-state multi-factor -2.52 -7.05 -8.93 0.01 -0.29 -5.40 -6.04 0.04
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) 4.95 1.88 NA NA 2.35 0.64 NA NA
Panel C: T = 26 weeks
Linear multi-factor -0.59 -5.28 -8.94 0.00 -0.13 -2.41 -4.37 0.04
Two-state multi-factor 6.74 1.23 -2.43 0.07 3.40 0.15 -1.81 0.10
Three-state multi-factor 0.60 -4.63 -8.29 0.00 2.50 -1.63 -3,59 0.09
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) 6.47 3.66 NA NA 3.35 1.96 NA NA
Panel D: T = 52 weeks
Linear multi-factor -0.00 -3.15 -8.06 0.00 0.14 -1.30 -3.92 0.00
Two-state multi-factor 7.40 4.01 -0.90 0.09 4.22 2.34 -0.28 0.28
Three-state multi-factor 1.91 -3.41 -8.32 0.00 3.91 -0.68 -3.30 0.01
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) 7.19 4.91 NA NA 3.73 2.62 NA NA
Panel E: T = 156 weeks
Linear multi-factor 3.60 2.76 -5.97 0.00 1.89 1.55 -3.08 0.00
Two-state multi-factor 10.94 8.24 -0.49 0.07 6.78 5.70 1.09 0.01
Three-state multi-factor 7.43 5.70 -3.03 0.00 9.13 6.16 1.53 0.04
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) 10.31 8.73 NA NA 5.13 4.63 NA NA
Panel E: T = 260 weeks
Linear multi-factor 3.63 2.40 -5.99 0.00 1.87 1.38 -2.99 0.00
Two-state multi-factor 10.94 8.24 -0.15 0.09 7.58 5.68 1.31 0.00
Three-state multi-factor 7.81 4.65 -3.74 0.00 9.62 5.77 1.40 0.00
New model (ki = 2, ks = 3) 11.17 8.39 NA NA 5.31 4.37 NA NA
Table 2.10: Out-of-sample performance of an investor allowing for weekly rebalancing.
The investment period includes 200 periods from December 7, 2008 to September 23,
2011. The table displays the annualized mean return and certainty equivalent return
(CER) of investment performance under various models. ∆CER equals the CER of
a model minus that of the new regime switching model and the p-value measures the
significance level of the difference obtained through the bootstrap experiments with






























































































































Figure 2·5: Out-of-sample optimal weights for a buy-and-hold investor with 1-week
horizon under various models. The graph plots a buy-and-hold investor’s optimal
asset allocation to the 9 sector ETFs and T-bills under a linear multi-factor model, a
multivariate 2-state regime switching model, a multivariate 3-state regime switching
model, the new regime switching model with kz = 2, ks = 3. The evaluation period is
from November 30, 2007 to September 23, 2011, a total of 200 weeks. The investor’s
relative risk aversion coefficient is set at γ = 5.
cash in mid 2010 while all the other models make little changes to their total risky
position. As a result, large losses are avoided or alleviated during turbulent periods.
The new regime switching model assumes there are three states in the systematic
components of joint returns, which allows it to better capture the different patterns
and magnitude in each regime. Note that the three-state regime switching multi-factor
performs poorly in terms of CER at short to intermediate horizons. This implies that
a naive three-state or higher-state regime switching model can easily produce over-
parameterization and overfitting. Its poor out-of-sample performance provides some
evidence against this model specification. The new regime switching model mitigates
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the issue of over-parameterization by allowing the number of idiosyncratic regimes
smaller than that of the systematic risk components. The advantage of the new
regime switching model over the regime switching multi-factor models decreases as
the investment horizon increases. This is because the realized returns get smoothed
and the severe short-period losses have less impact on the CER as the investment
horizon increases.
2.7 Robustness Analysis
In this section, we consider a large set of systematic factors besides the market, size,
and value factors that affect the stocks returns. We begin with the momentum factor
Carhart (1997) and profitability and investment factors Fama and French (2015). The
idiosyncratic volatilities under the extended multifactor models still exhibit a strong
degree of co-movement.
In addition to these common factors, the liquidity and volatility factors can also be
plausible candidates to explain the non-linear pattern in the idiosyncratic volatility.
Here we use the spread between the US 3-month LIBOR and 3-month treasury bill
as a liquidity proxy. Moreover, we consider two volatility factors used in previous
studies: change in the VIX index as a new systematic factor as in Ang et al. (2006)
and the common idiosyncratic volatility (CIV) factor as in Herskovic et al. (2016). To
construct the CIV factor, we use all CRSP stock daily returns and compute the value-
weighted monthly idiosyncratic volatility estimates with respect to the Fama and
French three-factor model. Then we can get a firm’s exposure to the CIV innovations
as its CIV beta and sort the stocks into quintile according to their CIV-beta each
year. The CIV factor is constructed as a net zero investment portfolio that long the
highest quintile portfolio and short the lowest quintile portfolio.
We add these liquidity and volatility factors one by one to the Markov switching
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multi-factor models. However, adding these factors does not eliminate the strong
regime switching pattern in the standard deviation of the residuals with respect to the
extended multifactor factor model. This confirms that the strong degree of common
time variation in the idiosyncratic volatilities of different sector ETFs can not be
fully explained by exposure to systematic liquidity and volatility factors. This might
suggest the presence of a common latent factor with regime-switching behavior across
different sectors. However, identifying this common latent factor is beyond the scope
of this research.13
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter studies regimes in the sector ETFs and market, size and value factor
portfolios. The results show that regimes not only exist in systematic components of
sector ETFs driven by common risk factors and factor loading but also in idiosyn-
cratic return volatility. The idiosyncratic volatilities exhibit similar regime cycles
across different sectors. This suggests a common state variable in the idiosyncratic
component of the joint sector ETF returns, which can be described as a low-volatility
idiosyncratic regime and a high-volatility idiosyncratic regime. While the system-
atic components of sector ETF returns are better captured by a three-state Markov
chain, which can be interpreted as bull, bear and slow-growth states. An innovative
regime switching multi-factor model is thus proposed by introducing two different
state variables for the idiosyncratic and systematic parts of asset returns. Our empir-
ical analysis shows that the new regime switching model has a better trade-off between
in-sample fit and model parsimony than conventional regime switching multi-factor
models with a common Markov chain. A Gibbs sampling method is also introduced
to deal with the computational challenge due to the introduction of multiple Markov
13A related study is Akay et al. (2013), in which they uncover the common latent factor in hedge
fund index returns using a dynamic Markov regime switching state-space model.
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Chains and a large number of risky assets.
Furthermore, we study asset allocation implications under the regime switching
multi-factor model framework. The asset allocation weights vary significantly across
regimes and investment horizon. The out-of-sample asset allocation experiments
confirm the economic importance of accounting for regimes in portfolio decisions.
Investors change their portfolio weights considerably over time as they recursively
update their beliefs about the underlying state probabilities. The out-of-sample per-
formance results also show that the proposed regime switching model outperforms
the traditional regime switching multi-factor models in terms of certainty equivalent
return, especially at the short horizons. This highlights that correct specification of
regime structure and number of regimes are of equal importance in asset allocation
as accounting for regimes.
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Chapter 3
A Rationale for the Clientele Effect in Money
Management
3.1 Introduction
The money management industry is a very important segment of modern economies.
According to the 2019 report1 of Investment Company Institute (ICI), 44.8% of U.S.
households delegate the management of their wealth to professional managers and
the total net assets of U.S. mutual funds reached $17.7 trillion at year-end 2018.
Given the colossal size of the money management industry, studying the implica-
tions of a manager’s portfolio management skill on investors’ fund investment appears
to be a critical task. A substantial literature finds empirical evidence that the mutual
fund investors chase performance (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano,
1998). Berk and Green (2004) employ a model of competitive capital market and
rational learning to explain the fund-performance relationship. They argue that fund
managers with superior skills will manage more money but have the same fund returns
as less-skilled managers because of decreasing return to scale. Furthermore, Berk and
van Binsbergen (2015) assuming decreasing returns to scale use the value a mutual
fund extracts from capital markets to measure the fund’s skill and find the evidence
of investment skill. They also find that investors appear to be able to identify the
managers with superior abilities and invest more money in better funds. However,
1https://www.ici.org/pdf/2019_factbook.pdf
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one thing that has been missing from the traditional performance evaluation and fund
flow literature assuming decreasing returns to scale is the heterogeneity in investors’
preferences and its effect on the segmentation of fund investors, i.e., the clientele ef-
fect. In markets where segmentation is caused by clientele effects, the fund’s superior
performance will not necessarily attract more money if stochastic dominance rela-
tions prevail among funds for certain groups of investors facing a mutually exclusive
choice between a skilled and unskilled fund. In this case, certain risk-aversion types
of investors will prefer not to invest in a skilled fund despite its superior performance.
The size of a cohort of investors characterized by a possibly wealth dependent level
of risk aversion therefore can limit the size of assets under management independent
of the level of skill of the managers running the fund.
A growing literature shows that fund investors appear to segment the market
and demonstrates the importance of clientele effects in fund performance evaluation.
Blackburn et al. (2009) find that there are different investor clienteles in value and
growth funds and risk aversion is an important attribute to differentiate these two
groups of investors. They document that investors in value funds are more risk-
averse than investors in growth funds. Moreover, Chan et al. (2002) find that growth
managers have better abilities to generate alpha than value managers. Given the
empirical evidence for clientele effects based on the heterogeneity in investor’s risk
aversion and manager’s abilities, it should be investigated whether there is a rational
explanation for the clientele effects in the money management industry as an alter-
native for behavioral interpretations such as investor sophistication (Barber et al.,
2016).
This chapter studies the value of a manager’s market timing skill to fund investors
with heterogeneous risk preferences.2 The clientele effect emerges as an endogenous
2Despite the widespread belief that mutual fund managers lack skill (e.g., Carhart, 1997; Fama
and French, 2010), there is a growing number of studies that do find evidence of market timing skill
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result. We model a skilled fund manager as endowed with privately informed infor-
mation about the future market returns whose content is unknown to the investors.3
Our study focuses on market timing skill for ease of presentation.4 The anticipative
information is always valuable to the manager and increases in the information pre-
cision (i.e., skill). However, when the manager and the investors exhibit different risk
preferences, the private nature of this information can be costly and even adverse to
the investors. We show that the investors whose risk aversion lies above a threshold
value related to the manager’s risk prudence would prefer the unskilled fund to the
skilled one given a mutually exclusive choice between the two. Thus, there possibly
are two distinct clienteles to skilled and unskilled funds dependent on the distribu-
tion of risk aversion relative to the threshold separating the two groups. Investors in
skilled funds are uniformly more risk-tolerant than investors in unskilled funds.
We also analyze the impacts of commonly used portfolio management contracts
on investors’ fund investment. The management fee is typically a portion of the
delegated wealth’s value. In addition to this purely proportional fee contract, the
compensation schemes including a performance-based fee that depends on the excess
return of the managed portfolio relative to a benchmark are common in the money
management industry. In the absence of performance fees, we find that investors
whose relative risk aversion exceeds the relative prudence coefficient of the logarith-
mic fund managers always prefer the unskilled fund to the skilled fund irrespective of
excess returns’ measures like alpha and Sharpe ratios generated by the skilled fund.
Conversely, investors with relative risk aversion smaller than the manager’s relative
(e.g., Mamaysky et al., 2008; Elton et al., 2012; Kacperczyk et al., 2008).
3Our study does not consider the effort incentive problem and thus abstract from moral hazard
consideration. We assume that investors can observe managers’ skill level and risk preference. Koijen
(2014) shows that the manager’s skill and risk preference parameters can be estimated using the
volatility of fund returns.
4In unreported results, we consider both stock selection and market timing skills in a multi-asset
setting, and the clientele effect results are qualitatively similar.
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prudence will choose the skilled funds. The clientele effect result still holds under
the fulcrum and asymmetric performance fees. In contrast to the constant threshold
under the purely proportional fee, in the presence of performance fees the relative
risk aversion thresholds are affected by the skill, contract parameters, and market
conditions. The comparative static analysis shows that the relative risk aversion
threshold is substantially affected by the sensitivity of the contract with regard to
the underperformance penalty. We find that including a fulcrum fee in the man-
ager’s compensation contract could lead to a higher value of manager’s information
to sufficiently risk-averse investors than that under option-like asymmetric fees. This
suggests the use of fulcrum fee for investors who are much more risk-averse than the
fund manager.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we derive and analyze optimal portfolio
choices of a fund manager with private information. The informed manager receives
a private signal about future market excess returns with noise.5 In the presence of
management fees, the investment problem is no longer maximizing the manager’s
utility function of terminal fund portfolio, but rather a composed utility function of
fund performance. In particular, with asymmetric performance fees, the composed
utility function is neither concave nor differentiable in the terminal value of fund
portfolio. We employ the concavification technique pioneered by Aumann and Perles
(1965), Carpenter (2000), Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) and Bichuch and Sturm (2014)
to solve the manager’s maximization problem. In the second step of the analysis,
we study the value of the manager’s information to investors and the clientele effect.
Following Detemple and Rindisbacher (2013) (henceforth DR), we show that the
public state price density (SPD) second-order stochastically dominates the private
SPD. The clientele effect result follows from the second-order stochastic dominance
5The manager’s skill is from his private information. Henceforth, informed is used interchangeably
with skilled.
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relationship and the fact that the composed utility function of investors (i.e., the
utility derived from delegation to the manager as function of the SPD) may be concave
or convex in the SPD depending on the investors’ risk aversion is larger or smaller than
a threshold value. We specialize our general results to the noisy return forecast model
and conduct a comparative static analysis to understand the impacts of performance
fees on investors’ preference between skilled and unskilled funds in an empirically
relevant setting. Finally, we discuss extensions of results to more general settings that
fund managers have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preference and investors
can invest in the market index, as an alternative to investing in the active funds.
Our study contributes to the growing literature on the clientele effect in the money
management industry. Clientele effects are of great interest to research in behavioral
finance. Prior studies attribute the clientele effects to irrationality, investor sophisti-
cation or other psychological tendencies (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Del Guercio
and Reuter, 2014). Compared to behavioral attributes that may or may not determine
fund clienteles, to derive the emergence of clienteles endogenously based purely on
risk aversion is a viable rational alternative and as such of first order importance. In
this chapter, we show that the investor clientele in a skilled fund is more risk-tolerant
than the investor clientele in an unskilled fund. This result is consistent with some
recent empirical findings and facts. Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) document that
the mutual fund market is a segmented market catering to two distinct types of in-
vestors: direct-sold investors and broker-sold investors. Their results also suggest that
direct-sold fund managers are more skilled than broker-sold fund managers because
direct-sold funds have stronger incentives to hire managers with superior abilities.
A recent survey by Investment Company Institute (2018) on the profile of mutual
fund shareholders documents the difference between between broker-sold investors
and self-directed investors. Investors who purchase mutual funds through the broker
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channel are less wealthy (with a median household income of $103,700 vs. $110,000)
and a bit more risk-averse (with 40% vs. 44% reporting that they are willing to take
above-average investment risk).
Second, our analysis is related to the delegated portfolio management literature.
Existing theoretical research on delegated portfolio management focuses on two main
areas. The first strand of literature studies how commonly observed compensation
contracts affect manager’ decisions (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Carpenter,
2000; Hugonnier and Kaniel, 2010). The second examines the optimal contract design
problem (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1997; Li and Tiwari, 2009). We complement
this literature by considering a different problem. Rather than solving for the opti-
mal design of contracts in general, we analyze the impacts of performance fees on the
value of the manager’s private information to investors. Grinblatt and Titman (1989)
argue that contracts should be designed with caps and have penalties for performance
below the benchmark to mitigate the adverse risk incentives of managers. However,
the manager is allowed to have a personal portfolio and hedge the management fees in
their model. Even without the unrealistic assumption that the manager has personal
accounts, our results suggest that the investors who are sufficiently more risk-averse
than the manager may include a fulcrum fee component in the manager’s compensa-
tion contract to realize higher value from the manager’s superior information.
Finally, our study is closely related to DR. They develop a structural dynamic
model of market timing and find that individuals with relative risk aversion greater
than the relative risk prudence of a log manager will never prefer the skilled fund.
However, their model does not consider the presence of compensation contracts be-
tween investors and fund managers. Sotes-Paladino and Zapatero (2017) find that
fulcrum fees are able to help align the risk preference of investors and managers,
which may distort the clientele effect results. Our study considers the presence of
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linear and non-linear performance fees and examine their impacts on investors’ fund
choice. Moreover, DR only consider log managers and investors need to make a bi-
nary choice between skilled and unskilled actively managed funds. In extensions to
our basic setup, we consider settings that both investors and managers have CRRA
utility and investors can choose to invest in a passive alternative. We show that
the clientele effect still exists and it is affected by the fee structures, market con-
ditions, and the manager’s skill level. The comparative analysis shows that if the
types of these contracts are not properly chosen, the manager’s private information
would be costly and even detrimental to some fund investors. Our results suggest
that highly risk-averse investors should employ skilled fund managers with a linear
performance-based contract in order to benefit from the manager’s superior abilities.
This chapter is based on my co-authored paper Hu and Rindisbacher (2018). It
is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the economic setup. It also presents
the investment problems of managers and investors. Section 3.3 solves the portfolio
optimization problem of an informed fund manager under commonly observed per-
formance contracts. Section 3.4 analyzes the value of manager’s private information
and the clientele effect. Section 3.5 specializes the general results to the noisy re-
turn forecast model. Section 3.6 provides a detailed numerical analysis of the value
of manager’s information and investor’s fund choice under fulcrum and asymmetric
performance fees. Section 3.7 studies extensions of the basic model. Conclusions are
in Section 3.8.
3.2 Model
This section describes the economic setup and the portfolio management problems
of managers and investors. Financial markets and the information structure are de-
scribed in Section 3.2.1. Section 3.2.2 introduces the private information price of
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risk. The agents and their risk preference are described in 3.2.3. The manager’s opti-
mization problem is described in Section 3.2.5. Section 3.2.6 describes the investor’s
problem.
3.2.1 Financial Markets and Information Structure
Financial markets are represented by a risky market portfolio (or stock) and a riskless
bond. We work with the following model of timing information considered by DR.
The instantaneous market excess return (dRmv ) and the gross market excess return
(Smτi−1,τi) over a period [τi−1, τi) are given by











where σm is positive and bounded away from zero. The volatility coefficient σm, the
public market price of risk θm, and the interest rate r are stochastic process adapted
to public information. The bond’s price dynamics are given by dBv = rvBvdv.
An informed agent has access to private information about future market excess




where Fm(·) represents the public information generated by market excess returns dRm,
and FY(·) represents the filtration generated by a private signal Y . We assume that





where τi is a sequence of deterministic dates with τ0 = 0, τN ≤ T , 1[τi−1,τi)(v) equals








for some function g and random variable ζi, independent of the public information
FmT . The independent random variable ζi introduces noise into the private signal
Gi, thus ruling out arbitrage opportunities for the informed agent within the period
[τi−1, τi). The private signal works as follows. At time τi, the informed agent observes




and obtains the anticipative information
about the gross market excess return for the period [τi, τi+1). As time elapses, the
informed agent learns from public information about realized market returns but the
signal Gi+1 remains valuable to her even if the time is very close to τi+1. At τi+1, a new
signal realization is observed and the process repeats. In this way the informed agent
maintains her information advantage against those who only have public information
about market realized returns.
As in reality that active funds report their realized returns with a typically coarse
schedule, we assume that informed agents only need to report their realized fund
returns at τ0 and τN for the period [τ0, τN ]. Fv = Fmv ⊗ Faτ0 denotes the public
information at time v ∈ [τ0, τN), where Fmv is the filtration generated by realized
market returns and Faτ0 is the filtration generated by previously reported fund return.
At time τN , FτN = FmτN ⊗ F
a
τN
. We suppose that the investment evaluation period
coincides with the time interval between the reporting dates, i.e., T = τN − τ0.
3.2.2 Information premium
An agent with only public information has a premium per-unit risk denoted by the
public market price of risk θm. The private (anticipative) information changes the
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for all v ∈ [0, T ]. PIPR represents the incremental price of risk, relative to θmv , due
to private information. The informed agent’s total price of risk is thus given by
θv ≡ θmv + θGv . When the agent has no private information, G(·) = Fm(·) and the PIPR
is null. If the agent is endowed with perfect foresight, the PIPR explodes and there
exists an arbitrage opportunity. Noisy private information will lead to a PIPR with
finite value and there is no arbitrage opportunity.
The market excess returns have representation dRmv = σmv ((θmv + θGv )dv + dW Gv )
under G(·), where dW Gv ≡ dWmv − θGv dv is a Brownian motion relative to the private
filtration G(·).
3.2.3 Agents
We consider an economy populated by three types of agents: investors, a skilled fund
manager, and an unskilled fund manager. All agents are price-takers. The investors
and the unskilled fund manager have only access to public information, while the
skilled fund managers have private information about future market returns G(·).
We assume that an investor at time 0 needs to make a choice between delegating
the portfolio management of her wealth to either the skilled fund manager or the
unskilled fund manager. No additional share purchases or redemptions are allowed
during the whole investment period. The fund managers do not to have any private
wealth and derive utility from the management fees received at terminal date.
We assume that both skilled and unskilled fund managers have logarithmic util-
ity function uM(x) = log(x) and fund investors have CRRA utility with different
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1−R if R > 0, R 6= 1,
log(x) if R = 1.
Section 3.7 also examines the case of managers who have CRRA utility function with
R 6= 1.
3.2.4 Manager’s Compensation Contract
As is standard in practice, we assume that a manager is compensated at time T
with a management fee FT which depends on the end-of-period value of the fund
portfolio and the end-of-period value of a benchmark portfolio. Let XaT represent
the value assets under management (AUM) at the terminal date T . We assume that






T ;α, β1, β2, δ, πb
)



























where α, β1, β2, πb are exogenously given parameters, δ = Xa0/Xb0. The management
fee at time T consist of three parts: a regular fee αXaT which is proportional to









. We assume that α > 0, β2 ≥ β1 ≥ 0.
This ensures that F is increasing and convex in the fund portfolio’s end-of-period
value XaT and decreasing in the benchmark portfolio’s end-of-period value XbT . The
benchmark portfolio process XbT is generated by a dynamic trading strategy πbv, which
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is known to all market participants.
The contract specification is general enough to encompass typical fee structures
for different types of investment companies. When the performance bonus is sym-
metric to the underperformance penalty, β1 = β2, the performance fee is linear in the
excess return of the actively managed fund relative to the benchmark. It is known as
a “fulcrum” fee. The 1970 Amendment to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 rules
that the U.S. mutual fund’s performance fees must be the “fulcrum” type. The SEC
approved the use of asymmetric performance fees in contracts for investment advisers
of wealthy individuals in 1985. A recent study by Ma et al. (2016) argues that, even
though the advisory contracts between the asset management companies and fund
investors are prohibited from having asymmetric incentive fees, the compensation
incentive contracts for portfolio managers are not subject to this regulatory restric-
tion. They document that typical compensation contracts signed by the U.S. mutual
fund managers are the asymmetric, option-like type. Hedge funds are not subject to
the fulcrum fee requirement, and asymmetric performance fees β1 = 0, β2 > 0 are
the norm. Performance-based fees were also allowed by the Labor Department for
corporate pension funds in 1986 (see Cuoco and Kaniel, 2011).
3.2.5 Manager’s Problem
We consider a portfolio optimization problem of a privately informed fund manager.
The problem of an uninformed manager with only public information is a special case
with the PIPR θG is null. Managers receive an initial endowment Xa0 from investors
and choose admissible trading strategies (written πav ∈ Gv) to maximize the expected















dXav = Xav rvdv +Xavπavσmv ((θmv + θGv )dv + dW Gv ), (3.7)
Xav ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ [0, T ]. (3.8)
Note that all the coefficients are adapted to the to the private filtration G(·), the man-
ager’s investment problem collapses to a traditional portfolio optimization problem.
3.2.6 Investor’s Problem
We assume that investors cannot directly invest in the financial markets and need to
employ a fund manager. Suppose that investors can observe the manager’s skill level
and risk preference. At time 0, an investor makes a choice between delegating his
wealth to either the skilled manager or the unskilled manager based on only public
information. The decision to delegate is exogenous. It captures in a reduced form the
choice to abstain from direct investing because of participation constraint, transaction
costs or other frictions. The composed utility function of an investor who delegates






























the management fee paid to the manager. A fund investor maximizes the expected
















T is the optimal terminal fund value chosen by the skilled fund manager
and Xa,u
∗
T is the optimal terminal fund value chosen by the unskilled fund manager.
Extensions to the basic model consider a more general case that, alternatively to
employing active managers, investors can choose a passively managed index fund.
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3.3 Manager’s Optimal Portfolio Policies
This section solves an informed manager’s portfolio optimization problem under “ful-
crum” and “asymmetric” performance fees.
The portfolio optimization problem (3.6) can be restated in the static form (see



















∣∣∣G0] ≤ Xa0 (3.11)
and non-negativity constraints in (3.8).









ther concave nor differentiable in XaT ; it cannot be solved using the usual approach.
On the other hand, the fund manager’s marginal utility at zero is negative infinity,






must be strictly positive at time
T . It follows that XaT > X(XbT ), where X(Xb) = β1δXb/(1 + β1). The objective
function uM(F (·, Xb)) is piecewise concave and piecewise differentiable on the inter-
val [X(Xb),∞), we can follow Aumann and Perles (1965), Carpenter (2000), Cuoco
and Kaniel (2011) and Bichuch and Sturm (2014) in constructing the concavifica-
tion vM(·, Xb) of uM(F (·, Xb)) (that is the smallest concave function that dominates
uM(F (·, Xb)) for all Xa ≥ X(Xb). Lemma 1 and 2 below are closely based on Lemma
1 and 2 in Cuoco and Kaniel (2011).
Lemma 1. Suppose that Xb > 0, α > 0, β2 > β1 ≥ 0, there exist unique X1(Xb) and
X2(Xb) with
X(Xb) < X1(Xb) < δXb < X2(Xb)
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that satisfy the system of equationsα(1 + β2)u
M
x (F (X2(Xb), Xb) =
uM (F (X2(Xb),Xb))−uM (F (X1(Xb),Xb))
X1(Xb)−X2(Xb) ,
(1 + β1)uMx (F (X1(Xb), Xb)) = (1 + β2)uMx (F (X2(Xb), Xb)).




, direct computation shows that
X1(Xb) =
( ηR − 1) β11+β1 + η(1− 1R) β21+β2
η − 1
 δXb,



















− β11 + β1
)
δXb + β11 + β1
δXb > X(Xb),




− β11 + β1
)
δXb.
Lemma 2. Suppose that Xb > 0, let X1(Xb) and X2(Xb) be as in Lemma 1 if α > 0,
β2 > β1 ≥ 0 and X1(Xb) = X2(Xb) = δXb if α > 0, β1 = β2 ≥ 0. The concavified
objective function vM(·, Xb) of uM(F (·, Xb)) on [X(Xb),∞) is given by
vM(Xa, Xb) =

uM(F (Xa, Xb)) if X ∈ Y (Xb),
uM(F (X1(Xb), Xb))
+α(1 + β2)uMx (F (X2(Xb), Xb))(Xa −X1(Xb)) otherwise,
where Y (Xb) = [X(Xb), X1(Xb)]
⋃[X2(Xb),∞).
As illustrated in Figure 3·1, the concavified objective function vM(·, Xb) in Lemma 2
replaces part of the original non-concave function uM(F (·, Xb)) with a chord between
X1(Xb) and X2(Xb). The slope of the chord coincides with the slope of uM(F (·, Xb))
at X1(Xb) and X2(Xb), which makes the function vM(·, Xb) concave. Y (Xb) denotes


















Figure 3·1: Manager’s composed utility function and the concavified function. The
figure plots the manager’s composed utility function uM(F (·, Xb)) (red solid line)
and the corresponding concavified utility function vM(·, Xb) (dashed blue line) with
α > 0, β2 > β1 ≥ 0.
cause the chord between X1(Xb) and X2(Xb) lies above the true objective function
uM(F (·, Xb)), a fund portfolio’s value that takes on the value X1(Xb) in some states
or X2(Xb) in other states will dominate a fund portfolio’s value that takes on values
in the interval (X1(Xb), X2(Xb)) in some states with positive probability. Thus, the
manager will never choose a fund’s asset value that lies in (X1(Xb), X2(Xb)).
Since the new objective function vM(·, Xb) is concave, we can use the standard
method to solve the portfolio choice problem. The solution to the concavified problem
also solves the original portfolio optimization problem. The solution is described
formally as follows.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the performance fee is of the fulcrum type:




with α > 0, β2 ≥ 0.






















































where ys∗ = (1 + β2)/Xa0 and θGv is the PIPR (3.5). Correspondingly, the manager’s









Private information updates the informed manager’s perceived price of risk from
θm to θm + θG. The first two components in (3.12) are motivated by public informa-
tion and the remaining component in (3.12) is motivated by private information. If
the private signal is uninformative about future market excess returns, θG = 0 and
the optimal policy collapses to that of a manager with public information. Private
signals could induce either positive or negative PIPR. When E[dWmv |Gv] is posi-
tive (negative), the PIPR is positive (negative) and the privately informed manager
would invest more (less) in the market index than that of an uninformed manager.
The instantaneous fund excess return generated by the informed manager is given
by d−Rav = πa,s
∗
v d
−Rmv , where d−Rmv represents forward integration (see Russo and
Vallois, 1993). When private information induces a positive (negative) PIPR, the
optimally managed fund return’s volatility then increases (decreases) relative to that
of a fund based only on public information. Since fund returns are only reported at
the τ0, τN and informed manager’s trades are unobserved, this will not reveal private
information to the uninformed manager.
The optimal policy can also be decomposed into two components as in Equa-
tion (3.13). The first component is the mean-variance demand and represents the
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manager’s optimal risk taking absent the fulcrum performance fee. The second com-
ponent is the benchmark-hedging demand. It could either be positive or negative,
depending on whether the benchmark portfolio’s weight in the risky asset πb is higher
or lower than the mean-variance demand (θmv + θGv )/σmv . This component helps the
manager perfectly hedge her risk exposure to the benchmark portfolio. As a result,
the presence and composition of the benchmark are irrelevant to the manager’s com-
pensation at time T as given by (3.15). The manager’s compensation is affected by the
contract only through the proportional fee parameter α. Although the benchmark-
linked incentive parameters β2 and πb do not affect the manager’s compensation,
they, together with the proportional fee parameter α, have an impact on the ex-
pected utility of fund investors’ after-fee wealth. This will be analyzed in details in
Section 3.4.
In line with Sotes-Paladino and Zapatero (2017), we find that the proportional fee
parameter α does not affect the manager’s portfolio choice. This is in contrast to the
prior literature (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1997) with CARA utility function, in
which the proportional fees could affect the manager’s optimal risk exposure. Stronger
benchmark-linked incentive β2 leads to larger benchmark-hedging demand, which
could be either a long or short position. A higher fraction of the benchmark portfolio
invested in the market index increases the manager’s optimal risk exposure.















with α > 0, β2 > β1 ≥ 0.











































∣∣∣G0] = Xa0 .

















The first component in (3.16) corresponds to the optimal fund value absent per-
formance fees (β1 = β2 = 0). The remaining two components in (3.16) are induced
by the asymmetric performance fees, whose values depend on whether the normal-




or not. The optimal fund value at time T is
thus a piecewise function of the normalized SPD ys∗ξGT and the end-of-period bench-
mark portfolio value XbT . Optimal end-of-period fund value X
a,s∗
T is greater than











1/(ys∗ξGT ) + β2δXbT/(1 + β2) to 1/(ys
∗
ξGT ) + β1δXbT/(1 + β1).




, the managed portfolio
outperforms the given benchmark portfolio and the manager receives a relatively
high compensation α(1 + β2)/(ys
∗
ξGT ). Conversely, when the normalized SPD ys
∗
ξGT




, the managed portfolio underperforms the benchmark and the
manager’s compensation is then α(1 + β1)/(ys
∗
ξGT ). In contrast to the fulcrum type
fee case, the manager cannot completely hedge the risk induced by the asymmetric
performance fees by moving up or down the risky asset in the portfolio. All the
non-linear contract parameters will affect the manager’s compensation as well as the
derived utility of investors’ after-fee wealth. As in the fulcrum type fee case, the
proportional fee parameter α has no impact on the optimal fund value Xa,s
∗
T as given
by (3.16). Thus, it does not affect the optimal portfolio weight in the risky asset
either.
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3.4 Value of Information and the Clientele Effect
This section analyzes the incremental value of a manager’s private information relative
to public information and the clientele effect, which emerges as a result of investors’
choices. Section 3.4.1 examines the case of fulcrum type contracts. Section 3.4.2
studies the asymmetric performance fees case.
3.4.1 Fulcrum performance contracts
We start our analysis of an uninformed investor’s fund choice in the presence of




with α > 0 and β2 ≥ 0. The
performance-related component of the management fee F (XaT , XbT ) is linear in the
excess return of the managed fund over a benchmark. These types of contracts are
known as fulcrum performance contracts and commonly observed in practice. In 1970,
the amendment to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 rules that the U.S. mutual
fund performance fees must be the fulcrum type.
The (ex ante) value of private information for the fund manager can be computed
as the certainty equivalent return (CER) achieved with private information in excess
of the certainty equivalent return without the information advantage. It is described
next.
Proposition 3. Let process pG(·) ≡ {pGv (z) : v ∈ [τi−1, τi)} be the conditional density
process of the signal Gi given public information. In the presence of fulcrum perfor-




with α > 0 and β2 ≥ 0, the (ex
ante) incremental value of the private signal Yv =
∑N
i=1Gi1[τi−1,τi)(v) for the manager
is



























∣∣∣∣Fτi] is the relative entropy of the
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signal. The private signal has no value to the manager if and only if the PIPR is
null.
The value of information to the fund manager (3.18) is non-negative and increasing
in the absolute value of the PIPR. Proposition 3 also shows that the source of private
information value is the relative entropy between an uninformed individual’s beliefs




measures the information gained when one updates her beliefs from the prior prob-




public information at time τi provides valuable information about the signal Gi rel-
ative to the public information at time τi−1, the relative entropy will be positive. If
the signal is unrelated to the public information, the prior and posterior probability
distributions will be the same, leading the relative entropy to be zero.
Neither the fulcrum performance fees nor the proportional fees affect the value of
information to the fund manager. Since the manager is able to undo any benchmark-
linked incentive implemented through linear contracts, the manager’s excess CER
is unaffected by the power of incentives β2 or the benchmark composition πb. The
proportional fee parameter α does not affect the manager’s excess CER either. This
is because the skilled (respectively unskilled) manager’s compensation at time T is
αXa0/ξ
G
T (respectively αXa0/ξmT ), α vanishes when the excess CER is computed.
Let I(y, b) = 1−α−αβ2
y

































unskilled (respectively skilled) fund manager optimizes her portfolio based on the
public SPD ξm (respectively private SPD ξG). Investors would prefer a skilled fund
instead of an unskilled fund when U s > Uu. Let U s ⊂ U be the subset of investors’
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Let F ξm,b (respectively F ξG ,b) be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ξmT
(respectively ξGT ) conditional on the σ-algebra generated by the benchmark portfolio at
time T , σ(XbT ). As E
[
ξGT
∣∣∣σ(XbT )] = E [ξmT ∣∣∣σ(XbT )] (see the proof of Proposition 4),
one does not dominate the other in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Let
T ξ,b be the cumulative spread between the distributions of private and public SPDs
conditional on σ(XbT ).
Proposition 4. The public state price density second-order stochastically dominates
(SSD) the private state price density





G ,b(y)− F ξm,b(y)
)
dy ≥ 0 for all z ∈ R+.
(3.19)
Proposition 4 generalizes the stochastic dominance result of DR, allowing the
distribution of the SPDs to be conditional on the benchmark and signal realizations
for the whole investment period. The second-order stochastic dominance result follows
from the fact that the ratio of private and public SPDs corresponds to the product of








ξGT have the same mean conditional on σ(XbT ), the private SPD ξGT is a mean-preserving
spread of the public SPD ξmT .
The SSD result has the potential to formulate a second-order stochastic dominance
test to evaluate whether actively managed funds have timing skills or not controlling
the effects of management fees. For example, with a linear performance-based fee,
the test can be implemented using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic or other statistics



















Proposition 5 describes the value of private information to investors and the clien-
tele effect by making use of the SSD result.





with α > 0 and β2 ≥ 0, the value of the manager’s private signal Gi
(3.4) to an investor with relative risk aversion R is

























. The set of investors who prefer
the skilled fund U s = {u ∈ U : ∆ > 0} =
{

































where y∗ = (1 + β2)/Xa0 is the Lagrange multiplier, R is the relative risk aversion
(RRA) of investors. The unskilled fund is preferred by investors with utility function
in the set Uu = {u ∈ U : ∆ < 0} =
{
u ∈ U : V f < 0
}
. For any level of skill, there
exists a value R∗ > 0 and investors with coefficient of RRA exceeding R∗ will choose
the unskilled fund.
In particular, with purely proportional fees β2 = 0, skilled fund returns are pre-
ferred by all investors with R < 2. Conversely, investors with relative risk aversion
R ≥ 2 will be better off choosing the unskilled fund irrespective of the skill level. The
RRA threshold value 2 here corresponds to the relative risk prudence (RRP) of the
manager with log utility.
Expression (3.20) describes the (incremental) value of the manager’s private signal
to an investor. It is the analog of (3.18), except that all the contract parameters affect
the investor’s excess CER. The risk aversion misalignment between the manager and
investors leads to a loss of the value of the manager’s information that investors can
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exploit. Proposition 5 shows that when the misalignment is large enough, the value
of the manager’s private information to an investor might even be negative.
Proposition 5 also provides a characterization of potential investors in a skilled
fund. It shows that investors with RRA less than the manager’s RRP always prefer
the skilled funds to unskilled ones. However, when investors’ relative risk aversion
is sufficiently high, they would choose the uninformed funds rather than the ones
which have access to anticipative information. In particular, when the management
fee is purely proportional to the end-of-period AUM (β2 = 0), the manager’s optimal
portfolio collapses to the mean-variance demand. This leads to a fixed relative risk
aversion threshold, equaling the manager’s RRP, that divides the investors into dif-
ferent clienteles to skilled and unskilled funds. Investors with relative risk aversion
less than the manager’s RRP prefer the skilled fund return; conversely, investors with
RRA exceeding the manager’s RRP never prefer the skilled return independently of
all the parameters. The result incorporates the special case of no management fee
considered in DR.
In the presence of fulcrum performance fees, for any given skill level there always
exist investors whose RRA exceeds a threshold value R∗ will prefer the unskilled fund
manager to the skilled one. R∗ is determined by the equation ∆(R) = 0. If the
solution is not unique, we have an odd number of roots and there still exists a group
of highly risk-averse investors whose RRA larger than the largest root will choose
the unskilled fund. The threshold value R∗ is no longer constant but depends on
the manager’s skill, contract parameters, and market conditions. The clientele effect
is a direct result of the SSD relationship between public and private SPDs and the
composed utility function of the investor u◦I is strictly concave (respectively convex)
in the SPD ξ if and only if R ≥ R∗ (respectively R < R∗).
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3.4.2 Asymmetric performance contract
Although the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 places restrictions that
U.S. mutual funds’ advisory contracts must be the fulcrum type, many U.S. hedge
funds, institutional funds, and mutual funds outside the United States employ the
asymmetric fees (Golec and Starks, 2004). Furthermore, a recent study by Ma et al.
(2016) document that most of U.S. mutual fund managers are offered the option-like,
performance-based compensation contracts.
We assume that both the skilled and unskilled fund managers receive asymmetric









the same parameters α > 0, β2 > β1 > 0. It is shown in (3.17) that the optimal fund
value and manager’s compensation are both piecewise functions of the normalized
state price density and benchmark portfolio’s value. Let
g(y, b) = 1
y






















) . The skilled and unskilled fund managers’ compensation








































= Xa0 . (3.22)
72






















Note that ys∗ is a random variable that depends on the realization of the private
signal G1 and solves the Equation (3.21). By contrast, in the case of the fulcrum type
fee, ys∗ is independent of the signal and it equals yu∗ .
Proposition 6. In the presence of asymmetric performance fees:








with α > 0, β2 > β1 > 0,
the ex ante value of the private signals Gi with i = 1, . . . , N to a fund manager is
V M,a ≡ CERM,s − CERM,u = E
[
log g
c(ys∗ξGT , XbT )
gc(yu∗ξmT , XbT )
]
and the value of the private signals Gi with i = 1, . . . , N to a fund investor is




















Proposition 6 describes the value of private information to the fund manager and
investors in the presence of asymmetric fees. Since the manager cannot completely
undo the incentives implemented through non-linear contract, her excess CER is no
longer independent of the contract parameters. The investor’s excess CER is also
affected by all the parameters.
Since the derived utility function of a fund investor (3.23) is neither concave
nor convex in the normalized SPD, we cannot apply Jensen’s inequality to compare
the value functions U s and Uu as in Proposition 5. The intuition that risk-aversion
misalignment may also lead to a negative value of information to investors with asym-
metric performance fees is confirmed in the numerical examples described in Section
3.6.
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3.5 Noisy Return Forecast Timing Model
In this section, we specialize to the case of a private signal with a linear-multiplicative
form. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that r, θm, σm, πb are constant and
there is only one signal received during the investment period. Thus, N = 1 and
τ0 = 0, τN = T .
Suppose that the skilled fund manager receives a private signal which informs the
future market excess return with noise. We consider a signal (3.4) with the linear
multiplicative form6








where W ζ is a standard Brownian motion process, independent of the market innova-
tion Wm. Thus, log(ζ) ∼ N(−(σy)2T/2, (σy)2T ), and E [ζ | Fmt ] = 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
The logarithm of the signal is the cumulative local excess return of the market plus
a normally distributed noise term. Smaller volatility σy makes the signal more infor-
mative. The inverse volatility (σy)−1 measures the information extraction skill of the
fund manager. A more-skilled manager is able to extract more precise information
than a less-skilled manager. An unskilled manager does not observe the signal or has
a signal with pure noise.
Corollary 1. Suppose that θm and σm are constant and the private information fil-
tration is G(·) = Fm(·)
∨FY(·), where Fm(·) is the public information generated by the
market returns and FY(·) is the filtration generated by the private signal (3.25). For






6The form is an extension of the return forecast model studied in DR section 2.1 by allowing
the variance of the signal noise to increase as the timing interval T increases. Thus, the manager
is not able to extract more precise information about the future market returns because of shorter
investment period T.
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and the PIPR is given by






where φ(·) is the standard normal probability density distribution function and
d(x, t) = log(x)− Et[log(G)]√
Σt,T
,







T + σmWmt .
Corollary 1 shows that the PIPR is linear in the innovation in the log signal
logG − Et[logG] and inversely related to the log signal’s conditional variance Σt,T .
The sign of the PIPR is the same as that of the innovation in the log signal. As time
elapses, the informed manager learns from market realized returns and revises her
assessment of risk and PIPR. For a fixed signal realization and realized gross excess
return Smt , an increase in the skill level s raises the absolute value of the PIPR. When
σy = 0, the informed manager has perfect foresight about future returns, the PIPR
explodes as the time approaches T , and an arbitrage opportunity emerges. When the
signal is uninformative s = 0, the variance of the noise goes to infinity and the PIPR
is null.
The optimal informed investment policy with the fulcrum fees is given by (3.13).
When the PIPR is positive (negative), the informed manager invests more (less) in
the risky stock, and the volatility of the informed fund portfolio is greater (smaller)
than that of the uninformed fund portfolio. Since the optimal informed policy and the
fund return volatility are linear in PIPR, they share the same structure and properties
as PIPR’s . For a given innovation logG−Et[logG], as time passes, a manager with
positive news increases the share of the risky asset in the portfolio as the variance of
the forecast decreases.
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Corollary 2 describes an explicit formula for the incremental value of a manager’s
information to a fund manager with a logarithmic utility function and fulcrum fees.
Corollary 2. In the presence of fulcrum performance fees:




with α > 0, β2 ≥ 0,
the ex ante value of the private signal G, as described in (3.25), to a fund manager
with logarithmic utility function is





As shown by the expression (3.26), the manager’s excess CER is positive and
increasing in the skill level and the market volatility. A manager with greater skill level
is able to extract more precise information about the future market excess returns.
When the market is more volatile, the private signal is more valuable to the informed
manager. The value of the private information does not depend on the public market
price of risk θm or the timing interval T .
Corollary 3 gives an explicit formula for the value of information to a fund investor
with relative risk aversion R and purely proportional fees.
Corollary 3. Suppose managers’ compensation at time T is purely proportional to the
terminal value of the managed portfolio F (XaT ) = αXaT with α > 0 and investors’
relative risk aversion coefficients R < 1 +
√
1 + (σy/σm)2. 7 The incremental value
of the log manager’s private signal G (relative to public information), as described in
(3.25), to the investor and its first derivative with respect to the skill s = 1/σy are












(R− 1)2(R− 2)(θm)2T (σm)2














s [R(R− 2)(σm)2 − 1/s2]2
.
7This condition guarantees the ex ante expected utility of a fund investor invests in the skilled
manager is finite.
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When R < 2, the value of private information V p is positive and it is increasing in the
skill. Conversely, when R > 2, the value of private information V p becomes negative
and it is decreasing in the skill. Consequently, investors with relative risk aversion
R < 2 would choose the manager with the highest level of skill on the market, and
investors with R > 2 would prefer the manager with the lowest level of skill.
Corollary 3 extends the result in Proposition 5 by showing that investors could be
categorized into two groups: one group who would choose the most-skilled manager
and the other group who would choose the least-skilled manager. The private infor-
mation is only valuable and increases in skill level for investors whose relative risk
aversion is smaller than 2, the relative prudence of the log manager. These investors
would choose managers with the highest skill level on the market. If the investor’s
relative risk aversion is greater than 2, the value of the manager’s private signal to
investors becomes negative due to its private nature, and the private information’s
negative effect on the investors’ utility is more prominent as the manager’s skill level
increases. As a result, investors with R > 2 are better off choosing the least skilled
manager.
We illustrate the intuition behind the clientele effect in Figure 3·2, which presents
the properties of fund returns in the noisy return forecast timing model. From the
perspective of an investor who has only public information, a higher skill level of
manager increases the portfolio’s downside tail risk as shown in the right panel. This
directly follows from the fact that the manager’s anticipative information is noisy. A
more skilled fund manager may suffer from larger losses when her signal is misleading.
This explains why investors with sufficiently high relative risk aversion will choose
the least skilled fund.
The result that there exist two distinctive groups of investors is notable and has
important implications. The left panel in Figure 3·2 shows that the Sharpe ratio
of the skilled fund’s net return is monotonically increasing in the manager’s level of
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Figure 3·2: Sharpe ratio and probability density of after-fee fund returns under public
information in the noisy return forecast model. The left panel shows the Sharpe ratios
generated versus the manager’s skill under the fulcrum fee contract. The right panel
plots the probability density function of after-fee fund returns with three different skill
levels under the fulcrum fee contract. The fixed parameter values are α = 0.6%, β1 =
β2 = 2%, σm = 0.155, θm = 0.47, δ = 1, πb = 0, T = 1.
skill. Since Sharpe ratio is a commonly used criterion to consider when investors make
investment decisions, Corollary 3 implies that a certain group of investors would not
invest in the most skilled funds despite that a high Sharpe ratio is generated. The
result thus highlights the importance of controlling heterogeneity in investors’ risk
preference when one evaluates investors’ fund investment.
Corollary 4 gives explicit formulas for the optimal portfolio choices and fund value
in the presence of asymmetric fees.
Corollary 4. Define the constant ∆β = β21+β2 −
β1
















with α > 0, β2 > β1 > 0,
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As shown in (3.29) and (3.30), the manager’s optimal portfolio is a sum of a
standard mean-variance component plus additional components. The difference be-
tween the manager’s optimal portfolio policy and the mean-variance demand can
be interpreted as the hedging demands, motivated by the asymmetric performance
fees. The second component is the hedging demand due to the performance bonus
αβ2(XaT −δXbT )+. The last component is the hedging demand due to the performance
penalty −αβ1(XaT − δXbT )−. Equations (3.31) and (3.32) show that in the presence
of asymmetric fees the optimal trading strategies cannot fully hedge the manager’s
exposure to the benchmark portfolio. There is a jump in the manager’s end-of-period
compensation when the normalized SPD y∗ξT hits the critical value Ψ(XbT ). As in
the linear contract case, the proportional fee α does not affect the manager’s optimal
portfolio either. However, α and other contract parameters do affect the manager’s
compensation as well as the investor’s after-fee wealth.
The informed agent’s price of risk is changed from θm to θm + θG due to the
private information. When the private signal is uninformative or the manager lacks
true timing skill, σy = ∞, the PIPR is null and the optimal portfolio of the skilled
manager as given by (3.30) collapses to that of his unskilled peer as given by (3.29).
In particular, expression (3.27) and (3.28), evaluated at t = T , identify the opti-




This section conducts a numerical analysis of the value of information and investors’
preference between skilled and unskilled funds in the noisy return forecast model.
Section 3.6.1 examines the value of the manager’s information to investors under the
three commonly used contracts. Section 3.6.2 conducts a sensitivity analysis of the
investor’s relative risk aversion threshold and the key parameters.
We calibrate the parameters of risky and risk-free assets using quarterly U.S.
data beginning in 1947 and ending in the first quarter of 2010. The risky asset is
constructed using the CRSP value-weighted index, while the risk-free rate is con-
structed from real returns on the 3-month Treasury bill. The market parameters are
θm = 0.47, σm = 15.5%, r = 3.5%.
We consider three performance fee structures: purely proportional fees, fulcrum
performance fees, and asymmetric performance fees. In the last two cases, the per-
formance fee is added on top of a non-zero proportional fee (α > 0). Based on
the evidence reported by Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) that “the value-weighted average
proportional component across funds charging performance fee is 60 basis, and the
typical fulcrum performance fee is 2%; both on an annual basis.” We set α/T = 0.6%
and β1 = β2 = 2%/α for the fulcrum fees, where T is the investment horizon. For
asymmetric fees, we analyze the most commonly observed two-twenty hedge fund
contract and set α/T = 2%, β1 = 0, and β2 = 20%/α. For ease of exposition, we set
the benchmark portfolio’s weight in the stock πb to be 0.8 Ma et al. (2016) document
“the performance evaluation window in mutual fund industry ranges from one quar-
ter to ten years, and the average evaluation window is three years.” We consider an
investment horizon T of three years. The skill level s = 1/σy is calibrated to be in the
range of (0, 10) to deliver a range of (0, 20%) for excess certainty equivalent return
8Hedge funds usually use 0% return or treasury rates as the benchmark in the incentive scheme
(see Brown et al., 1999). The results for πb ∈ (0, 1] are qualitatively similar.
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Figure 3·3: The value of private information to investors in the noisy return fore-
cast model. The left panel plots the investor’s excess CER from delegation under
purely proportional fee contract as a function of the investor’s RRA coefficient, with
different skill levels s = 1, 3, 5. Excess CERs are computed as the investors’ CER
from delegation to skilled funds in excess of the CER from delegation to an unskilled
fund. The contract parameters are α/T = 0.6%, πb = 0. The middle panel plots the
investor’s excess CER from delegation under the fulcrum fee contract as a function
of the investor’s RRA coefficient, with different skill levels s = 1, 3, 5. The contract
parameters are α/T = 0.6%, β1 = β2 = 10/3, πb = 0. The right panel plots the
investor’s excess CER from delegation under asymmetric fee contract as a function
of the investor’s RRA coefficient, with different skill levels s = 1, 3, 5. The fixed
parameters values are r = 3.5%, θm = 0.47, σm = 0.155, δ = 1, T = 3.
under the setting of purely proportional fees. We set the parameter δ = Xa0/Xb0 = 1.
3.6.1 The Value of Information
Figure 3·3 presents the investor’s excess CER from delegation under three different fee
structures (purely proportional fees, fulcrum fees, and asymmetric fees) as a function
of the investor’s coefficient of relative risk aversion R, for various timing skill levels.
It shows that in all three cases the investor’s excess CERs are all decreasing in R and
become negative as R hits a threshold value R∗.9 It is notable that when investors
9The threshold value R∗ is constant under purely proportional fees, while it depends on the
parameters under asymmetric and symmetric fees.
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are sufficiently risk-averse (R > R∗), the value of the manager’s private information
to investors is negative and investors prefer the unskilled fund to the skilled ones.
This suggests that there are different groups of investors to skilled and unskilled
funds under commonly observed portfolio management contracts. Under the same
fee structure, investors in skilled funds are a more risk-tolerant clientele than investors
in unskilled funds.
Notably, Figure 3·3 also shows that the higher the skill, the steeper the lines of
investor’s excess CERs. The value of the private information to the relatively risk-
tolerant individuals (R < R∗) increases as the skill level of manager increases. On the
contrary, relatively risk-averse individuals (R > R∗) suffer from larger losses when the
manager is more skilled. This implies that some asset allocation or hiring decisions
are inappropriate. If fund investors or owners are sufficiently more risk-averse than
the managers, they should not delegate the portfolio management to the manager
with a higher skill level.
The intuition for these results is as follows. Private information adds value to in-
vestors because it helps investors better assess investment opportunities. An increase
in the manager’s skill increases private information precision. However, the investors
do not just evaluate the benefits of private information precision but also take into
account the cost incurred by the noisy nature of this information. The downside tail
risk of portfolios is also increasing in the manager’s skill and has a negative effect
on the value of private information. When the investor’s risk aversion is sufficiently
low, the information precision effect dominates and the investor would choose the
fund manager with the highest skill. Conversely, when the investor’s risk aversion is
sufficiently high, the downside tail risk effect dominates and the investor would prefer
the unskilled fund.
As shown in Proposition 1, and displayed in the left panel of the figure, the thresh-
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old value for the investor’s coefficient of relative risk aversion is the relative prudence
of the logarithmic fund manager irrespective of the manager’s skill level in the purely
proportional fee case. In the presence of fulcrum fees, the risk aversion threshold
value is larger than that with purely proportion fees. The middle panel shows that
the threshold value R∗ is around 10, and investors with R < R∗ prefer the skilled
fund and are able to extract positive value from the private signal under delegation.
Conversely, investors with R ≥ 2 will prefer the fund without any anticipative infor-
mation. Interestingly, for the two-twenty asymmetric performance fees, the threshold
value for the coefficient of the relative risk aversion is around 2, as displayed in the
right panel. In contrast to the constant threshold in purely proportional fee case, the
threshold value R∗ in both the fulcrum and asymmetric fee cases is not constant and
is affected by the manager’s skill, the contract parameters, and the market conditions.
Table 3.1 shows investors’ CER from delegation to a skilled fund manager and the
value of manager’s private information to the investors (excess CER) across the three
commonly observed types of contracts: proportional-only fees (α > 0, β1 = β2 = 0),
asymmetric performance fees (α > 0, β1 = 0, β2 > 0), and symmetric performance
fees (α > 0, β1 = β2 > 0). The excess CERs are computed as the investors’ CER from
delegation to the skilled funds in excess of the CER from delegation to the unskilled
fund as given by (3.20) and (3.24). Table 3.1 shows that symmetric performance
fee contract dominates proportional-only fee contract and asymmetric performance
fee contract for investors with risk aversion larger than or equal 2 in the sense that
the CER and excess CER are both higher under symmetric fee contract. For the
relatively risk-averse investors with R ≥ 2, the fact that CERs are higher indicates
symmetric performance fee contract entails less welfare loss.10 This is consistent with
10The welfare loss is due to the misalignment between the risk aversions of manager and investors.
The manager will choose a portfolio that deviates from the investor’s desired policy π∗ that investors
would choose if they had access to the same private information as the manager. The inclusion of
symmetric performance fees might also be welfare-improving for relatively risk-tolerant investors
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CER, Excess CER (%)
Investor’s risk aversion 1 2 3 4 5
s = 1 Proportional-only 44.82 1.19 10.50 0.00 -27.34 -4.71 -76.27 -20.50 -153.34 -64.44
Asymmetric 26.03 -1.06 -18.91 -0.17 -68.14 -3.32 -113.60 -10.59 -158.04 -20.89
Symmetric 17.61 -0.55 15.03 0.29 13.04 0.19 11.44 0.15 10.10 0.13
s = 3 Proportional-only 53.42 9.79 10.50 0.00 -125.47 -102.83 -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞
Asymmetric 34.81 9.85 -17.21 1.54 -129.26 -64.45 -293.35 -190.34 -385.59 -251.45
Symmetric 21.43 4.36 17.20 2.47 14.57 1.72 12.68 1.39 11.19 1.23
s = 5 Proportional-only 67.15 23.52 10.50 0.00 -1.45e6 -1.45e6 -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞
Asymmetric 48.26 23.29 -19.21 -0.46 -186.88 -122.07 -335.82 -232.81 -419.85 -282.71
Symmetric 27.23 10.16 20.79 6.06 17.36 4.51 15.04 3.75 13.30 3.33
Table 3.1: Investors’ CER and excess CER from delegation. This table reports the
investors’ certainty equivalent returns (CER) from delegation to a skilled fund man-
ager and excess CER, which measures the value of the manager’s information to
the investors, under proportional-only fees, asymmetric performance fees and sym-
metric fees for different skill levels and investors’ relative risk aversion R. Ex-
cess CER is computed as the CER from delegation to a skilled fund in excess of
the CER from delegation to an unskilled fund. The fixed parameter values are
r = 0.035, θm = 0.47, σm = 0.155, δ = 1, T = 3, s = 1, α/T = 0.02, πb = 0. For
proportional-only fees, β1 = β2 = 0. For asymmetric fees, β1 = 0, β2 = 0.2/α. For
symmetric fees, β1 = β2 = 0.2/α.
the finding of Sotes-Paladino and Zapatero (2017), in which they endogenize the con-
tract parameters and show that symmetric performance fee contract is optimal and
welfare-improving for investors irrespective of the investors’ risk aversion relative to
the manager’s. Since the excess CERs measure the value of the manager’s informa-
tion to investors, the results suggest that highly risk-averse investors may include
a symmetric performance fee in the manager’s compensation to realize higher value
from the manager’s anticipative information.
3.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis
To analyze the sensitivity of the relative risk aversion thresholds under fulcrum fees,
Figure 3·4 illustrates the effects of skill s = 1/σy, proportional fee α, fulcrum incentive
β2, market price of risk θm, and market volatility σm. The upper panels show that
the relative risk aversion threshold is almost invariant to the proportional fee α but
















































































































Figure 3·4: Sensitivity of RRA threshold to model parameters under the fulcrum
fee contract. The figure presents the RRA threshold R∗ of investors under fulcrum
type contract versus proportional fee parameter α, performance bonus parameter β2,
(public) market price of risk θm, market volatility σm and the fund manager’s skill
level s. The fixed parameter values (where applicable) are r = 3.5%, θm = 0.47, σm =
0.155, δ = 1, T = 3, α/T = 0.6%, β1 = β2 = 10/9, πb = 0 and s = 5.
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increases in the fulcrum incentive β2. According to Proposition 5, the risk aversion
threshold under fulcrum fees is larger than that under purely proportional fees. An
increase in the fulcrum incentive β2 diminishes the relative impact of proportional
fee component on fund managers’ compensation. Consequently, the risk aversion
threshold is higher with more powerful incentive β2. Similarly, since the relative
impact of the proportional component is independent of the parameter α, there is
little effect of the proportional fee α on the risk aversion threshold. The lower-left
panel shows the clientele of skilled fund expands as the market improves (θm increases)
and a one-unit increase in the skill would lead to a larger increase in the risk aversion
threshold when the market price of risk is higher. This is because the negative effect
of downside risk on investor’s choice is alleviated in good states. By contrast, the
value of the private information to a manager does not depend on the market price
of risk θm as shown in Corollary 2. The lower-right panel of the figure displays that
the set of investors in skilled fund is larger when the market is more volatile and
this effect is more pronounced for high skill level. The higher market volatility the
more valuable the information advantage. Therefore, more investors are investing in
skilled funds. As shown in all the panels of the figure, the investor’s relative risk
aversion threshold is increasing in skill. The intuition is as follows. The higher the
manager’s level of skill, the more advantageous the private information relative to
public information, the higher the value of the private information to the investors in
skilled funds.
Figure 3·5 plots the risk aversion threshold of investors as a function of key pa-
rameters with asymmetric performance fees. It shows that in the absence of penalty
component (β1 = 0) the risk aversion threshold with different parameters lies in a
relatively small range [1.8, 2.3]. This indicates that the proportional fee α, bonus in-






















































































































































Figure 3·5: Sensitivity of RRA threshold to model parameters under asymmetric fees
contract. The figure presents the RRA threshold R∗ of investors under asymmetric
performance fees contract versus proportional fee parameter α, penalty parameter β1,
performance bonus parameter β2, (public) market price of risk θm, market volatility
σm, the skill level s and the benchmark portfolio’s weight in the stock πb. The fixed
parameter values (where applicable) are r = 3.5%, θm = 0.47, σm = 0.155, δ = 1, T =
3, α/T = 2%, β1 = 0, β2 = 10/3, πb = 0 and s = 5.
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on the investor’s preference between the skilled and unskilled fund. The risk aversion
threshold seems to slightly increase in the market price of risk θm, market volatility
σm, and manager’s skill s. The qualitative relationships are similar to those under
fulcrum fee contract. One major observation in Figure 3·5 is that the range of the
risk aversion threshold as a function of the penalty sensitivity β1 is much larger than
that of other parameters. This implies that the value of market timing to investors is
much more affected by the penalty sensitivity β1 than the bonus incentive β2 or other
parameters. Increasing the penalty sensitivity β1 leads to a wider investor clientele
in skilled funds. This is because an increase in the penalty sensitivity β1 causes the
managers to reduce portfolio volatility and alleviates investors’ concerns about the
larger tail risk in the skilled fund relative to the unskilled fund.
The fulcrum fee contract can be regarded as the extreme case of the asymmetric fee
contract with underperformance penalty sensitivity β1 equals to the outperformance
bonus incentive β2. Comparing the Figure 3·4 and Figure 3·5 further illustrates that
the qualitative impact of adding a penalty component into the manager’s compen-
sation scheme on the value of the manager’s information to investors. It shows that
the risk aversion threshold is larger under fulcrum fees than under option-like asym-
metric fees. Furthermore, the variations in the investor’s risk aversion threshold as a
function of different parameters are more pronounced with fulcrum fees compared to
those with option-like asymmetric fees. The results suggest the important role of the
underperformance penalty component in affecting the value of the manager’s private
information to investors and their fund investment. When investors are sufficiently
more risk-averse relative to managers, the fulcrum fee contract serves the purpose
of realizing positive value from the manager’s private information better than the
option-like asymmetric fee contract. On the other hand, if managers are able to
dictate the fee structure, the unskilled managers may abstain from including an un-
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derperformance penalty in their contracts in order to expand their clientele when
soliciting funds from potential investors.
3.7 Extensions of the Model
Suppose that θm, σm, r are constant and there is one signal received by the informed
manager at the inception of the investment period, namely N = 1, τ0 = 0, and
τN = T . For tractability, we assume that the manager observes the private signal
with linear multiplicative form as described in (3.25) and takes prices as given.
3.7.1 Managers with Constant Relative Risk Aversion
We generalize the logarithmic manager assumption and consider an informed manager
who has general CRRA utility with a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to
Ra. The manager maximizes the expected utility of her management fee, which is a
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The next proposition describes the manager’s optimal investment strategies.
Proposition 7. Suppose that θm and σm are constant and the private information
filtration is G(·) = Fm(·)
∨FY(·), where Fm(·) is the public information generated by the
market returns and FY(·) is the filtration generated by the private signal (3.25). Con-
sider a manager with a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to Ra. The manager’s
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and the optimal risk exposure at time t ∈ [0, T ] is given by
π∗t =πmt + πht =
Σt,T
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Σt,T =(σm)2(T − t) + (σy)2T.
The manager’s compensation at time T is









As shown by Equation (3.33), the optimal portfolio policy can be decomposed into




. Relative to the logarithmic case, the mean-variance demand
is scaled by the manager’s relative risk aversion, and the optimal portfolio choice has
an additional term, reflecting the manager’s hedging behavior. The dynamic hedging
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Since the public market price of risk θm is constant, the hedging demand is motived
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by the stochastic fluctuations in θGt . As shown in (3.36), when the manager is more
risk-averse than a log manager, her hedging demand is positive (negative) if the total
price of risk (θm+θGt ) is positive (negative). Moreover, as time passes, the magnitude
of the hedging demand decreases, inducing the informed manager to adjust the share
of stocks in the portfolio. πht → 0 when clock approaches the terminal date T . A
longer investment horizon reduces the magnitude of the hedging demand and the
horizon effect is weaker for a manager with higher skill. Finally, the magnitude of the
hedging demand is decreasing in the variance ratio (σy)2/(σm)2. This implies that a
more skilled manager will have a larger hedging demand.
With proportional only fees, the risk sharing is perfect and the proportional fee
does not affect the manager’s portfolio. The proportional fee parameter α only affects
the manager’s compensation as well as the investor’s welfare.
Corollary 5 describes the value of the private information to a fund investor (Excess
CER) when both the manager and investor have CRRA under purely proportional
fees.
Corollary 5. Suppose the manager’s compensation at time T is purely proportional
to the terminal value of the managed portfolio F (XaT ) = αXaT with α > 0 and the
manager (respectively investor) has CRRA utility with a coefficient of relative risk
aversion equal to Ra (respectively R). The incremental value of the manager’s private















2(Ra)2(R(Pa−R)(σm)2+(Ra)2(σy)2) , if R < R
e
−∞, if R ≥ Re,





a is the manager’s relative risk prudence
coefficient.
Note that as the precision of the private signal goes to infinity, namely σy → 0,
the investors with relative risk aversion R smaller than the manager’s relative risk
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prudence P a will choose the skilled fund. Conversely, the investors whose relative risk
aversion R lies above the manager’s relative risk prudence P a will prefer the unskilled
fund.
The fact that the investors with R > P a will prefer the uninformed manager to
the informed one though the informed manager has nearly perfect private information
about the future market returns is remarkable. Corollary 5 implies that the clientele
effect result still holds under the case of managers with CRRA preference. Assuming
the manager has logarithmic utility Ra = 1 leads to a special case of the finding in
Corollary 3.
Figure 3·6 illustrates the threshold of investor’s RRA when the managers also have
general CRRA utility. The threshold values can be obtained by finding the root of
V p = 0 numerically. Re provides an upper bound for the RRA threshold. Contrary
to the logarithmic manager case, the investor’s RRA thresholds here are affected by
the manager’s skill s = 1/σy as well as the market conditions θm, σm. The upper
left panel shows that the investor’s RRA threshold is decreasing in the manager’s
skill when the manager’s RRP is above 2, whereas the investor’s RRA threshold is
slightly increasing in the manager’s skill level when the manager’s RRP lies below
than 2. Consistent with the theoretical finding in Corollary 5, it appears that the
investor’s RRA threshold converges to the manager’s relative risk prudence as the
skill level increases. The remaining panels show that the investor’s RRA threshold is
decreasing in both the market price of risk and market volatility when the manager’s
RRP is above 2. However, the pattern changes when the manager’s RRP is below 2.
3.7.2 Passive Alternative
We further extend the model in Section 3.7.1 by allowing the fund investors to choose
a passively managed index fund (e.g., market index) as an alternative to the actively
managed funds. Suppose that investors choose among an actively managed skilled
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Figure 3·6: Investor’s RRA threshold versus manager’s RRP under purely propor-
tional fees. The figure presents the relative risk aversion threshold of investors under
purely proportional fee contract versus manager’s relative risk prudence coefficients
and skill levels. The fixed parameter values (where applicable) are r = 3.5%, θm =
0.47, σm = 0.155, s = 5, T = 3, α/T = 2%.
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fund, an actively managed unskilled fund, and the market index. The fund investor’s










where XsT (respectively XuT ) is the optimal terminal fund value chosen by the skilled
(respectively unskilled) fund manager with relative risk aversion Ra and XmT is the
market index as given by Equation (3.1). The parameter αC with C ∈ {s, u,m}
represents the proportional fee charged by these funds.
Figure (3·7) illustrates the fund investor’s choice among a skilled fund manager,
an unskilled fund manager, and the market index as a function of the investor’s RRA
and the manager’s RRP. It highlights the impact of the manager’s and investor’s risk
preference on fund investors’ investment behaviors.
Although some investors turn to index investing, the clientele effect still exists in
the active management industry. Unskilled fund investors (represented by the dark
blue area) are generally more risk-averse than skilled fund investors (represented by
the light blue area). Figure (3·7) illustrates this finding for different level of skills.
A bit surprisingly, the unskilled fund is not completely dominated by the passive
index fund for relatively risk averse investors, but depending on the RRP of the
fund managers. When the fund managers are relatively risk-averse (e.g., P a > 5),
the investors whose risk aversion above the red solid line will choose the unskilled
fund manager. The intuition is that as the manager’s risk aversion increases, the
misalignment between the risk preference of the unskilled manager and the relatively
risk-averse investors becomes smaller than that between the risk exposure of the
market index and the investors’ optimal portfolios. In the same vein, when the risk
preference misalignment between manager and investors |R − Ra| is large enough,
the alignment of the passive fund and the investors’ optimal portfolios is better than
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Figure 3·7: Investor’s choice among skilled, unskilled, and index funds under purely
proportional fees. The figure presents the investor’s choice among skilled, unskilled,
and index funds under purely proportional fee contract. The dark blue area repre-
sents the region in which the investors will choose skilled fund. The light blue area
represents the region in which the investors will choose unskilled fund. The grey
areas represent the regions in which the investors will choose the index fund. The
black dotted line represents Re as a function of manager’s RRP. Parameter values are
r = 3.5%, θm = 0.47, σm = 0.155, T = 3, α/T = 2% for active (skilled and unskilled)
funds and α/T = 1% for the passively managed index fund.
that of the active fund managers’ and investors’ optimal portfolios. As a result, these
investors will choose the passively managed index fund, as represented by the grey
regions in the above plots.
Another insight derived from Figure 3·7 is that investor’s choice between active
and passive investing does not only depend on risk preference of manager and investor,
but also on the manager’s skill level. As seen in the figure, the grey regions expand as
the manager’s skill s decreases from 7 to 3. It implies that the investors in passively
managed index funds are growing as the active managers become less skilled. This
result is consistent with the findings of many studies that managers’ abilities to beat
the market declines as the active management industry size increases in recent decades
and this could help explain the growing popularity of index funds (e.g., Berk and
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Green, 2004; Pástor and Stambaugh, 2012).
3.8 Conclusion
The clientele effects in the money management industry have been widely docu-
mented. Prior literature attributes these clientele effects to irrationality or psycho-
logical tendencies. In this chapter, we establish a rational theory to explain the
clientele effect in the money management industry and show that investors in skilled
funds are uniformly more risk-tolerant than investors in unskilled funds.
Taking a general parametric class of contracts as given, we first derive and analyze
the optimal trading strategies of the skilled fund manager who is endowed with private
information about future market returns. Then we analyze the value of the private
information to both managers and investors. Though the privation information is
always valuable to the manager, it might not add value and may be harmful to
the investors who are sufficiently more risk-averse than the manager. Investors with
risk aversion exceeding a threshold value will never find it beneficial to delegate the
management of their wealth to the skilled fund manager. As a result, the fund
investor clientele is endogenously segmented. The relatively risk-tolerant investors
will prefer skilled funds, whereas the highly risk-averse investors will prefer unskilled
funds. This result provides theoretical justification for some recent empirical findings
of the clientele effect in the mutual fund industry.
In the absence of performance fees, the relative risk aversion threshold that sepa-
rates investors in skilled and unskilled funds equals the log manager’s RRP, irrespec-
tive of the skill or other parameters. When the fund manager receives performance-
based fees, the relative risk aversion threshold is affected by the skill level, contract
parameters, and market conditions. We specialize the general results to a parametric
timing model. A comparative static analysis of the risk aversion threshold is car-
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ried out to analyze the impacts of symmetric and asymmetric performance fees on
investors’ fund investment. The results suggest that sufficiently risk-averse investors
should include a fulcrum performance fee in the manager’s compensation contract for
the purpose of realizing positive value from the manager’s private information. The
intuition behind this is that lifting the penalty sensitivity to the same level of bonus
incentive reduces the portfolio’s volatility and alleviates highly risk-averse investors’
concerns about the larger downside tail risk in the skilled fund relative to the unskilled
fund.
Our qualitative results do not depend on the assumptions that managers have
logarithmic utility function or investors are restricted to choose among actively man-
aged funds. Extensions to the basic setup examine the cases of managers with general
CRRA utility and investors who can invest in a passive alternative. There still ex-
ist two distinctive groups of investors for skilled and unskilled funds. Moreover, our
results in Section 3.2 are easily generalizable to a multi-asset setting that managers




This dissertation examines the dynamic asset allocation problem in the presence
of regime switching and provides a rationale for the clientele effect in the money
management industry. The first model accounts for the regime switching dynamics in
the asset returns and a dynamic asset allocation problem is solved under a Bayesian
framework. The second model provides a theoretical justification for the clientele
effect in the money management industry and we study the implications of portfolio
management contracts on fund investment decisions.
In the first model. the results show that regimes not only exist in systematic com-
ponents of sector ETFs characterized by a common state variable in risk factors and
factor loading but also in idiosyncratic return volatilities. The idiosyncratic volatil-
ities exhibit similar regime cycles across different sectors. A new regime switching
multi-factor model is proposed to capture the different dynamics in the systematic
and idiosyncratic components of asset returns. A Gibbs sampling method is intro-
duced to deal with the computational challenge due to the introduction of multiple
Markov Chains and a large number of risky assets.
The empirical asset allocation experiments confirm the significant economic gains
of accounting for regimes in portfolio decisions. Investors change their portfolio
weights considerably over time as they recursively update their beliefs about the
underlying state probabilities and tend to hold more cash in high volatile states.
Moreover, the out-of-sample experiments show that the proposed regime switching
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model outperforms the traditional regime switching multi-factor models in terms of
certainty equivalent return, especially at the short horizons. This highlights that cor-
rect specification of regime structure and number of regimes are of equal importance
in asset allocation as accounting for regimes.
In the second model, the fund manager’s skill comes from his anticipative infor-
mation from future market returns and the private nature of this information can be
costly and even adverse to fund investors. Investors with risk aversion exceeding a
threshold value will never find it beneficial to delegate the management of their wealth
to the skilled fund manager. The fund investor clientele is thus endogenously seg-
mented. Investors in the skilled fund are uniformly more risk-tolerant than investors
in the unskilled funds.
We also examine the impacts of commonly observed portfolio management con-
tracts on the portfolio decisions of fund managers and investors. With only propor-
tional management fees, the relative risk aversion threshold that separates investors
in skilled and unskilled funds equals to the log manager’s RRP, irrespective of the
skill or other parameters. In the presence of performance-based fees, the relative
risk aversion threshold is affected by the skill level, contract parameters, and market
conditions. The comparative analysis suggests that sufficiently risk-averse investors
should include a fulcrum performance fee in the manager’s compensation contract for
the purpose of realizing positive value from the manager’s private information. The
intuition behind this is that lifting the penalty sensitivity to the same level of bonus
incentive reduces the portfolio’s volatility and alleviates highly risk-averse investors’





A.1 Chapeter 3: A Rationale for the Clientele Effect in Money Man-
agement
We assume that the following regularity conditions hold as in DR.
Assumption
Let θv ≡ θmv + θGv be an informed agent’s price of risk. For i = 1, . . . , N , the private
information price of risk θG and the informed trading strategy π satisfy the conditions








be the innovations in the gains from trade. Then, Hεi > −H i for some positive
G0-measureable random variable Hi with E[H i|G0] <∞ P-a.s.
The first condition ensures that the private information price of risk is finite, ruling
out arbitrage opportunities. The second condition rules out the “doubling strategies”.
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Proof of Lemma 1 . Suppose Xb > 0 and α > 0, β2 > β1 ≥ 0, there exist unique
numbers X1(Xb) and X2(Xb) solve the system of equations
uM (F (X2(Xb),Xb))−uM (F (X1(Xb),Xb))
X1(Xb)−X2(Xb)
= uMx (F (X2(Xb), Xb)α(1 + β2),
uMx (F (X1(Xb), Xb))(1 + β1) = uMx (F (X2(Xb), Xb))(1 + β2).
(A.1)









. In particular, if marginal utility is homogeneous of
degree −R, the above equations imply thatX1(Xb) + β1(X1(Xb)− δXb) = ρ(X2(Xb) + β2(X2(Xb)− δXb)),X2(Xb) = X1(Xb) + uM (αX2(Xb)+αβ2(X2(Xb)−δXb)−uM (ρ(αX2(Xb)+αβ2(X2(Xb)−δXb)))uMx (αX2(Xb)+αβ2(X2(Xb)−δXb))α(1+β2) .
Equivalently, uM is homogeneous of degree 1−R, we have
X2(Xb) = X1(Xb) + (1− ρ1−R)
uM(αX2(Xb) + αβ2(X2(Xb)− δXb))





































− β11 + β1
)
δXb + β11 + β1
δXb > X(Xb),




− β11 + β1
)
δXb.
Proof of Lemma 2. This closely follows the proof of Lemma 2 from Cuoco and Kaniel
(2011). The first equation in the system (A.1) shows that vM(·, Xb) is continuous at
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X2(Xb), while the second equation in the system (A.1) show that vM(·, Xb) is continu-
ously differentiable at X1(Xb). Thus vM(·, Xb) is continuously differentiable and con-
cave on [X(Xb),∞). Since vM(X1(Xb), Xb) = uM(F (X1(Xb), Xb)) and uM(F (·, Xb))
is strictly concave on the interval (X1(Xb), δXb] while vM(·, Xb) is linear, we must
have that vM(·, Xb) > uM(F (·, Xb)) on the interval. Similarly, we have vM(·, Xb) >
uM(F (·, Xb)) on the interval [δXb, X2(Xb)). Moreover, vM(·, Xb) = uM(F (·, Xb)) on
A(Xb), thus we have vM(·, Xb) ≥ uM(F (·, Xb)) on the interval [X(Xb),∞).
Suppose v̂M(·, Xb) is any concave function with v̂M(·, Xb) ≥ uM(F (·, Xb)) on the
interval [X(Xb),∞). It follows from the definition that v̂M(·, Xb) ≥ uM(F (·, Xb)) =
vM(·, Xb) on A(Xb). In addition, v̂M(·, Xb) is concave on the interval (X1(B), X2(B))
while vM(·, Xb) is linear, it follows that v̂M(·, Xb) > vM(·, Xb) on (X1(Xb), X2(Xb)).
Thus, vM(·, Xb) is the smallest concave function with v̂M(·, Xb) ≥ uM(F (·, Xb)) on
the interval [X(Xb),∞).
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that α > 0, β1 = β2 ≥ 0. The first order condition
of the fund manager’s static problem is

























where IM(·) is the inverse function of uMx (·) and ys

















The function χ(y) is continuous and strictly decreasing on (0,∞). Moreover, χ(y)→ 0
as y → ∞ and χ(y) → ∞ as y → 0. Therefore, there exists a unique ys∗ > 0 such
that χ(ys∗) = xa/(1 + β2). In particular, with uM(x) = log(x), ys
∗ = (1 + β2)/xa.
We can find the manager’s optimal portfolio choice by applying Itô’s Lemma on both
sides of (A.2) and matching the coefficients in front of dW Gv . The optimal portfolio



















Substituting the optimal fund’s end-of-period value (A.2) into the contract yields the




T ) = αxa/ξGT .
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that α > 0, β2 > β1 ≥ 0. The concavified util-
ity function vM concave and continuously differentiable on the interval [X(Xb),∞).
Thus we can solve the concavified problem using standard optimization theory. The
sufficient and necessary condition for Xa,s
∗







T ) = ys
∗
ξGT .


















+ β1δb1+β1 < X1(b) if y > Ψ (b) ,











) . The optimal









































) ∣∣∣G0] ≡ χ̃(ys∗).
The function χ̃(y) is continuous and strictly decreasing on (0,∞). Moreover, χ̃(y)→
β1X
a
0/(1 + β1) as y → ∞ and χ(y) → ∞ as y → 0. Therefore, there exists a unique
ys
∗
> 0 such that χ(ys∗) = Xa0 . With uM(x) = log(x), we immediately obtain (3.16)










































P (Gi ∈ dz|Fv+ε)





Therefore, with pGv (z) = P (Gi ∈ dz|Fv), for v ∈ [τi−1, τi) when z = Gi
θGv = lim
ε↓0

















= Dv log pGv (z)|z=Gi ,
where Ev[·] ≡ E[·|Fv].




with α > 0
and β2 ≥ 0, the managers compensation is αxa/ξT . Thus, the ex ante value functions



































































and the ex ante value of information
to the manager



























DvpGv (z)dWmv = pGτi−1(z) +
∫ τi
τi−1




pGv (z)θGv (z)dWmv .





















































Using Bayes’ rule P (dW
m|Fτi−1 ,Gi=z)
P (dWm|Fτi−1 )






























































































and the law of iter-








= ∑Ni=1 E [DKL(pGτi(Gi)|pGτi−1(Gi))]






















































= ∏Ni=1 pGτi−1 (Gi)pGτi (Gi) . Let E
[
·














































































= Eτ0,bT [ξmT ]







and note that ξGT = ξmT +εξ with Eτ0,bT
[
εξ
∣∣∣ ξmT ]. Thus
ξmT SSD ξGT in the mean-preserving spread sense.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose the performance fees are of fulcrum type:




with α > 0 and β2 ≥ 0.
The definition of certainty equivalent returns gives






















Thus, the value of the private signals Gi with i = 1, . . . , N within the period [0, T ] to
the fund investor with relative risk aversion R is


















Let F ξm,b (respectively F ξG ,b) be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ξmT
(respectively ξGT ) based on σ(XbT ), where σ(XbT ) is the filtration generated by the



































































































where the last equality follows from the fact T ξ,b(∞) = 0. Together with T ξ,b(z) ≥ 0









 ≤ 0 (respectively > 0) if vf (·, XbT )
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P a α(1 + β2)I(y∗z,XbT )

































(x) is the relative risk prudence








































Proof of Proposition 6. The claims immediately follow from the definition of the
value of the private signal.
Proof of Corollary 1. For t ∈ [0, T ), the conditional density of the signal is
















pGt (x) = ∂xPt
σm ∫ Tt dWmv + σy ∫ T0 dW ζv√
Σt,T
≤ d(x, t)







d(x, t) = log(x)− Et[log(G)]√
Σt,T
,
V ARt[logG] = (σm)2(T − t) + (σy)2T ≡ Σt,T ,
Et[logG] = logSm0,t + (σmθm −
1
2(σ
m)2)(T − t)− 12(σ
y)2T.


















































Thus, in the presence of fulcrum performance fees, the ex ante value of the private
signal G, as described in (3.25), to a fund manager is






Proof of Corollary 3. Using ξGT = ξmT
pG0 (G)
pGT (G)























































(R− 2)(σm)2 − (σy)2
































(R− 1)2(θm)2T (R− 2)(σm)2 − (σy)2


























(R− 2)(σm)2 − (σy)2



















































Thus, with purely proportional fees F (XaT ) = αXaT , the value of a private signal G to
investors with relative risk aversion R is

























2 (R(R− 2)(σm)2 − (σy)2) .
According to Proposition 5, V p > 0 when R < 2 and V p < 0 when R > 2. Differen-












+ (R− 1)2(θm)2T (σy)2
]
σy [R(R− 2)(σm)2 − (σy)2]2
.
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s [R(R− 2)(σm)2 − 1/s2]2
.
Suppose R < 1 +
√
1 + (σy/σm)2, which guarantees the ex ante expected utility of
a fund investor who delegates his wealth to the skilled manager does not explode,
∂V p
∂s
< 0 for R > 2 and ∂V p
∂s
> 0 for R < 2. Thus, investors with relative risk aversion
R < 2 would choose the manager with the highest skill level on the market, and
investors with R > 2 would prefer the least skilled manager.
Proof of Corollary 4. The optimal fund value of the uninformed manager at time






































































































(πbσm − θm)2 (T − t)
≡ d̄1,t.
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T − tz − 12z
2
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)− 12 (πbσm − θm)2 (T − t)√
(πbσm − θm)2 (T − t)
.
Similar computation applies to the second expectation of (A.6). The Lagrange mul-
tiplier yu∗ can be obtained by solving Xa,u
∗
0 = Xa0 . Plugging the two expectation
















In order to find the optimal fund value of informed manager, we need to find the



















(σm)2(T − t) + (σy)2T
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v is normally distributed under private information Gt with




d(G, t), σ2t,T =
ΣT,T (T − t)
Σt,T
.












































































































































































































































































)+ Σt,T (πb − θmσm − d(G,t)√Σt,T )2
− ΣT,T (πb − θmσm − d(G,t)√Σt,T )
σmσt,T
.
































































)+ Σt,T (πb − θm+θGtσm )2
− Σt,T (πb − θm+θGtσm )√
Σt,T − ΣT,T
.

















(N (−d+2,t) +N (d−2,t))
The optimal trading strategies of fund managers can be obtained by taking derivatives
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t ) and matching the coefficients in front of dWmt .
Proof of Proposition 7. The first order condition of the fund manager’s static prob-
lem is
((1− α)Xa∗T )−R


























)1−1/Ra] , F (Xa∗T ) = α (ξGT)−1/Ra Xa0HGT /HG0 .













































































Since Wmt,T is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance T − t under public











r + Σt,T (θ
m + θGt )2





















a − 1)(Σt,T − ΣT,T )















and πmt = π∗t − πht .
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(R− 1)(Ra + 1−R)(σm)2 + (R+ (Ra)2 − 2Ra)(σy)2
)
(R− 1)(θm)2T




















(R− 1)(Ra + 1−R)(σm)2 + (R+ (Ra)2 − 2Ra)(σy)2
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(R− 1)(θm)2T
2 ((1 +Ra −R)R(σm)2 + (Ra)2(σy)2)
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−(R− 1)(r + 12(θ
m)2)T + 12













Thus, with purely proportional fees F (XaT ) = αXaT , the value of a private signal G
to investors with relative risk aversion R is















2(Ra)2 (R(Ra + 1−R)(σm)2 + (Ra)2(σy)2) .
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